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ABSTRACT 
 
Analysts have become more important over the past years because the amount of 
information on the stock market has increased. It has led analysts to become stock 
market specialists and their opinions are needed. The Capital Asset Pricing model and 
the efficient market hypothesis cannot explain abnormal returns generated by following 
analysts’ recommendations. Investors induce stock price reactions when analysts issue 
new recommendations or change existing ones, which have caused short-term and long-
term abnormal returns. 
 
Several studies have suggested that abnormal returns follow analysts’ recommendations. 
When a new recommendation is issued, it immediately impacts the stock price. This 
thesis examines the phenomena through 2 distinct methods. Firstly There are three 
portfolios Buy, Hold and Sell constructed on the basis of analysts’ recommendations, 
which are then benchmarked with OMXH and OMXH24 market indices and a market 
model regression is applied to the results. The second part examines whether stocks 
with the same recommendation share some specific characteristics and therefore 
consciously or unconsciously impact on analysts’ recommendations. 
 
This study finds indication in the Finnish stock market that it is possible to outperform 
the market and generate significant abnormal returns by following favourable analysts’ 
recommendations. This study also continues the research in the area of identifying 
stock-specific characteristics, which consciously or unconsciously impact analysts’ 
recommendations. Stock characteristics of liquidity, price-to-book and size are 
documented to have a significant impact on the analysts’ recommendations in this study. 
Keywords: Analyst, stock price, recommendation, abnormal returns 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to provide support from previous studies for the hypothesis 
that analysts’ recommendations have an impact on stock returns in the Finnish stock 
market. Before the studies, the essential theoretical framework is demonstrated in order 
to provide solid basis for the reader.  Previous studies concentrate mostly on the U.S 
markets, but there is also some evidence presented from the emerging markets and the 
Nordics 
 
Lawrence D. Brown & Michael S. Rozeff (1978) defined analysts as operators who 
produce information and issue stock recommendations, which are used for investment 
decisions (whether to buy or not to buy a certain stock) on the stock market. Evli Bank 
analyst Mikko Ervasti (2013) defines analyst as follows: “An investment research 
analyst forecasts the financial future of a firm, helping investors get an understanding of 
future cash flows and hence the fair value of the firm's equity today”. On the contrary to 
the previous, Eugene F. Fama (1970) presented the hypothesis about efficient markets 
and concluded that all available information is reflected on stock prices. Therefore it 
shouldn’t be possible that analysts find new information about stocks. If they do, they 
are breaking the efficient market hypothesis. 
 
The Capital Asset Pricing Model is generally used to calculate the stock’s expected 
return. The model concludes that if share A generates more profit than share B, then 
share A must have a higher market-risk (Beta) than share B. Thus, if it is possible to 
achieve abnormal returns by following analysts’ recommendations, they must include 
new information, or the risk of the stock is calculated wrong, or the whole stock is 
evaluated wrong. Thus, analysts’ recommendations break the market efficiency and the 
Capital Asset pricing models’ valuation. Therefore it is concluded to be an anomaly. 
(Sharpe 1964; Lintner 1965; Mossin 1966.) 
 
Analysts have been researched since the 1930s. Alfred Cowles (1933) was the first one 
who did academic research on the subject. The research was about the analysts’ 
capability to foretell future stock prices. However, as an anomaly the analysts’ 
recommendations’ impact on stock returns is not very commonly known. There are 
several studies about analysts but not the anomaly itself. The anomaly has been 
acknowledged for 40 years. John D. Stoffels’s study in 1966 presented some facts 
considering analysts’ recommendations to cause stock price reactions. Barber et al. 
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(2001) documented that it is possible to achieve abnormal returns by following the most 
favourable analysts’ recommendations.  Fariborz et al. (2009) were researching the 
analysts’ recommendations on emerging markets (Brazil, Mexico etc.) and also 
suggested that abnormal returns follow recommendations. In addition, Loh and Stulz 
(2012) found that only 12% of the recommendations are influential and identified some 
of the analysts’ characteristics that explain the phenomenon. One of the latest studies in 
relation to the abnormal returns of the analysts’ recommendations is  the/a research 
paper by Bradley et al. (2014). They document that a favourable change in an analyst’s 
recommendation generates a return of 1,83% within 30 minutes of the issuance. In 
addition they conclude that the analysts are the most important source of information 
that is examined.  
 
 
1.1. Contribution 
 
The contribution of this thesis is to be the first one to investigate only the impact of the 
recommendations of the large stocks on stock returns with post-financial crisis data. In 
addition, this thesis continues to identify stock-specific characteristics that may 
consciously or unconsciously impact on the analysts’ recommendations. This subject 
has hardly been researched at all. Finally, the previous questions are examined before 
and after transaction costs. The latest study that focused on analysts’ recommendations 
impact on the Finnish stock market returns, taking transaction costs into account, was 
carried out in 2003 by Alexander Von Nandelstadh.  
 
 
1.2. Limitations 
 
The original data consisted of the 25 largest stocks on the Finnish stock market as of in 
the beginning of 2015. However, Valmet was dropped due to insufficient data 
availability and therefore only the 24 largest stocks are under examination. Also, only 
monthly data is used in this study. Analysing daily data and changes of the 
recommendations would be expected to increase the accuracy of the results. 
 
Portfolio with Buy recommendations has approximately 8 times fewer stocks on 
monthly average compared to Hold portfolio. The Hold portfolio is the largest every 
month during the sample period. Another significant observation is that there are no 
stocks in Buy and Sell portfolios during certain months. There are a total of 46 months 
13 
without Buy recommendations and a total of 9 months without Sell recommendations in 
the sample. For example in 2013 there are not a single stock in omxh24 with Buy 
recommendation. These observations suggest that analysts’ recommendation may also 
follow the economic state and their underlying target is to perform as accurate analysis 
as possible and not to recommend stocks in order to increase investors willingness to 
trade more. 
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2. RESEARCH PROBLEM 
 
 
This thesis aims to empirically examine whether abnormal returns were generated by 
analysts’ recommendations of the 24 largest stocks on Finnish stock markets. From this, 
it can be deduced whether the analyst recommendations include beneficial information 
for the investors or not. This study uses the pooled consensus recommendations of all 
outstanding analyst recommendations for each large stock under examination. The 
period under investigation covers years 1999 to 2014 in order to obtain a sufficient 
number of observations, because the recommendations are issued and pooled monthly. 
 
This thesis also examines whether there are some specific characteristics, which the 
stocks with the same recommendation share, and whether these characteristics impact 
the abnormal returns. In this part I aim to apply the accuracy of the analysts’ 
recommendations to the regression model by using the mean target prices of each stock 
outstanding. In addition to empirical analysis, this thesis deals with the underlying 
reasons for the anomalies on the markets and the role of the security analysts. 
 
This thesis aims to answer the following questions: 
 
i) Do stocks with similar recommendations generate abnormal returns on the 
Finnish stock market, even after transaction costs? 
 
ii) Do stocks with the same recommendation share similar characteristics which 
consciously or unconsciously impact the analysts’ recommendations? 
 
The returns of the stocks during the sample period vary greatly. In the beginning of the 
sample the markets underwent the so-called “dotcom” crisis that lasted until the year 
2001. After the crisis period, the returns steadily grew until the year of 2008, when the 
global financial crisis started. However, this thesis also captures the period after the 
financial crisis, from 2009 to 2014, which brings a new contribution for this study.  
 
 
2.1. Structure of the thesis 
 
Before the main empirical part, this thesis broadly explains the theoretical framework 
behind the impact of analysts’ recommendations on stock returns. The thesis begins by 
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explaining the theory of efficient market hypothesis and how psychology may impact 
investors’ and analysts’ decision-making processes. The fourth chapter deals with stock 
returns. It explains the theory behind stock returns, demonstrates basic stock pricing and 
valuation models and how the abnormal returns are measured. It also analyses the 
overall performance of the Finnish stock market. The fifth chapter is all about the 
analysts. It first defines who the analysts are and then introduces how they valuate 
stocks. Analyst behaviour studies are presented towards the end of chapter. The end of 
chapter five introduces studies relating to analysts’ recommendations’ impact on stock 
returns. Almost all of the previous studies were conducted on the U.S. stock market 
with a couple of exceptions. 
 
The Empirical part that starts in chapter 6 first describes the data and the sources and 
methods of collecting. The data consists of consensus recommendations of the 24 
largest stocks listed on Helsinki stock exchange, OMXH index, OMXH24 index, 1-
month euribor and different stock- and firm-specific figures and ratios, which are all 
calculated on a monthly basis. The sample period runs from 1999 to 2014. Chapter 7 
deals with the portfolio construction and regression analysis, which are used as methods 
in this study. The stocks under examination are divided into three portfolios on the basis 
of analysts’ consensus recommendations and the portfolios are updated every month if 
necessary. Portfolio returns are then benchmarked by the returns of two indices, the 
OMXH and the OMXH24. OMXH24 is used because it is constructed only on the basis 
of the 24 large stocks under examination and might thus hand out more accurate results. 
 
After the portfolio analysis, the results of my regression analysis are presented in 
chapter 8. This thesis uses a market model to examine is abnormal returns generated by 
following the analysts’ recommendations. The second empirical model is constructed on 
the basis of Peltoniemi (2012) in order to investigate whether there are some stock-
specific characteristics that the stocks with the same recommendation share and 
consciously or unconsciously impact the analysts’ recommendations, and thus explain 
the abnormal returns generated by the portfolios. Regression analysis aims to 
investigate and identify these characteristics and measure whether they have a 
statistically significant impact on the abnormal returns. Chapter 9 presents the 
conclusions of this thesis. 
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3. ARE THE MARKETS EFFICIENT? 
 
 
This chapter presents the theoretical framework of the modern stock markets. The 
chapter deals with the efficient market hypothesis and behavioral biases to provide the 
reader with the needed theory in order to understand the analysts’ role in the financial 
markets. 
 
 
3.1. Efficient markets 
 
An investment banker and a cook are walking down the street. One day they see a $50 
bill lying on the ground.  The Cook reaches to pick it up, when the investment banker 
stops him and says: “Don’t bother, if it was a real $50 bill, someone would have already 
picked it up.” This assumption that there are no free lunches supports the hypothesis of 
efficient markets. The story about the $50 bill gives you the impression that there is no 
chance that someone wouldn’t have picked it up. What if there was a chance? (Findlay 
& Williams 2000.) 
 
It is assumed that stock prices follow the so-called random walk, meaning that the 
consecutive price changes of stocks are independent. Prices don’t follow any kind of 
pattern or formula, because the odds for the price change are the same time after time. 
There is no chance to forecast next day’s stock price from the previous day’s price if the 
markets reflect all the new available information in stock prices immediately. (Brealey, 
Myers & Allen 2008: 355-358.) 
 
Fama (1970) concluded that the mission of the capital markets is to allocate money 
from the deficit area to the surplus area. In an ideal situation the market prices give 
accurate signals to investors about how to allocate their resources. Then companies and 
investors could trust that the market prices reflect all available information and they can 
make an investment decision. Efficient markets reflect all available information. (Fama 
1970.) 
 
Figure 1 demonstrates the efficient and inefficient price reactions. If a company 
announces bad news, the price of the stock sets immediately to the right level if the 
markets are efficient (green line). In inefficient markets the price reaction could be  
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delayed or there might be overreaction. A slow price reaction (blue line) creates 
arbitrage opportunities. (Nikkinen et al. 2002: 81.) Overreaction (red line) is caused by 
investors’ irrational behaviour, which is explained in next chapter psychological aspects 
of the markets. The overreaction is reversed in stock prices over time. (De Bondt and 
Thaler 1985.) 
 
Figure 1. Reaction of stock price to new information in efficient and inefficient markets 
and overreaction and delayed response to bad news (Shefrin 2002; Haugen 1997: 650.) 
 
Fama (1970) has set three conditions for the stock prices to adjust available information 
efficiently. (i) There are no transaction costs, (ii) Information is free and everyone can 
access it, and (iii) parties have the same opinion about the information’s effect on 
present and future securities prices. The markets are efficient when they reflect all the 
information there is. This means that it is possible to make investment decisions based 
on the available information. (Fama 1970: 386-387.) 
 
Fama (1970) also suggested that there are three levels of efficiency on the market 
because the markets are not perfectly efficient all of the time. Efficiency is based on 
availability and amount of information that is reflected to securities prices. In weak-
form efficiency the market prices reflect only historical information and investors cannot 
use technical analysis for forecasting returns. If market prices reflect past and public 
information (profit warnings, financial statements etc.) the markets are in semi-strong 
form. In strong-form market prices reflect historical information, public information and 
18 
private information. Private information is not public and some investors might have a 
monopolistic right for the information. (1970: 388) 
 
Fama (1998) filled in his efficient market hypothesis. He stated that efficient market 
hypothesis applies because anomalies are random results on the market and there is as 
much overreaction as there is underreaction to new information on the market. He 
proposes that anomalies could be observed when markets are divided into two parts by 
underreaction and overreaction. One conclusion also was that long-term return 
anomalies are sensitive to analysing technique and they can disappear because of the 
changes in technique. (Fama 1988.) 
 
Burton G. Malkiel (2003) was the first one who presented critique towards the efficient 
market hypothesis. He concluded that there are irrational operators on the market who 
cause short-term irregularities on stock prices and opportunities to predict stock prices. 
He also suggested that it is not possible to benefit from behavioural bias anomalies and 
gain excess returns even though markets are more efficient and unpredictable than other 
studies may suggest. Finally he states in his study that the efficient market hypothesis is 
going to lose its importance in 21st century and many researchers will believe that stock 
prices are partially possible to predict. (Malkiel 2003.) 
 
 
3.2. Psychological aspects of the stock market 
 
The financial markets have been researched as long as they have existed. George C. 
Selden (1912) was the first study to academically represent the psychological side of the 
capital markets. His book was titled “Psychology of the stock market”. The roots of 
stock market psychology reach to 19th century. In 1841, McKay’s Extraordinary 
Popular Delusions and The Madness Of Crowds presented the idea of fear. The book 
presented a chronological timeline of the panics and schemes throughout history. 
(Ricciardi & Simon 2000.) VIX index measures the implicit volatility of the SP500 
index that has been implied to measure the investors’ fear and it is called “investor fear 
gauge” (Robert E. Whaley 2000.) This section examines the behavioural side of the 
stock market and presents studies on the matter. The purpose is to give a preliminary 
look for the upcoming analysts’ behavioural biases in chapter 4. 
 
Robert J. Shiller (1981) noticed that stock prices increase relatively too high after 
announcements of dividend yields. Werner F. M. De Bondt and Richard Thaler (1985) 
19 
concluded that returns of the stocks which have performed particularly poor (loser 
stock) in the past outstrip returns of the stocks that have performed particularly well 
(winner stock) in the past. The investors’ overreaction to unexpected and dramatic 
events was proven to be the reason for this. Josef Lakonishok, Andrei Shleifer and 
Robert W. Vishny (1994) suggested that high returns of public information (accounting 
and price information) portfolios are consequences of investors’ extrapolation of past 
information. Kent Daniel, David Hirshleifer and Avanidhar Subrahmanyam (1998) 
recognised investors’ overreaction and underreaction, which are caused by investors’ 
overconfidence. Harrison Hong and Jeremy C. Stein (1999) studied overreaction and 
underreaction. They recognised two investor types. One type primitively follows price 
trends when the other type primitively follows market news.  
 
Behavioral finance, a new field of finance began to emerge during 1990s. It is a 
combination of psychology, sociology and finance. Behavioral finance investigates the 
cognitive factors and emotional issues that impact the investment decision-making 
processes of individuals, groups, and organizations. (Ricciardi & Simon 2000.) 
 
It is assumed that anomalies are the cause of market prices varying from their true value. 
If the markets were efficient in a traditional finance aspect, the stock prices should be in 
their intrinsic value, even if there are anomalies appearing on the market. (Shefrin 
2002:5) Behavioural finance argues against the claim that the stock price changes 
always reflect all available information and against the efficient market hypothesis. It 
also helps us understand phenomena in the economy, which are caused by investors’ 
humane weaknesses in allocating resources. (Shiller 2003.) 
 
3.2.1. Behavioral biases and market anomalies 
 
An anomaly is a model that describes the behaviour of stock prices, which doesn’t go 
hand in hand with the efficient market hypothesis. Alon Brav and James B. Heaton 
(2002) studied anomalies occuring on the financial market and analyzed two 
explanatory theories, investors’ irrational behaviour and rational structural uncertainty. 
They concluded that even if investors’ irrational behaviour causes anomalies, their 
disappearance could be dependent on rational learning, meaning that rational 
arbitrageurs are able to reject rational explanations for price formulas. Simply put, an 
anomaly is a deviation in efficiency. (Brav & Heaton 2002.) 
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Investors and portfolio managers actively keep their eyes and ears open. They try to 
know what other investors and managers are doing at all times and get tips on which 
stocks to buy or sell. And when things start to happen, everyone knows it and acts. This 
kind of behaviour is called herding. Herding causes problems, because it strengthens 
psychological biases on the market. Investors make decisions only based on the “feel” 
of the crowd instead of formal stock analysis. If investors happen to choose a “loser” 
stock, the regret they feel is lower when they know that other investors picked the same 
stock. (Nofsinger 2005:95.) 
 
Investors anchor on their stocks, which they have recently bought. Thus, they lose 
opportunities to buy other, possibly better stocks. On the other hand, it is possible to 
anchor on one’s own or others’ opinions and time after time make investment decisions 
based on these same opinions. (Nofsinger 2005:5.) 
 
The psychological meaning of overconfidence is that people overestimate their 
knowledge, underestimate risks and exaggerate their ability to control events. When 
making investment decisions, it is divided to two aspects, which are miscalibration and 
the better-than-average effect. Miscalibration occurs when an investor’s probability 
distributions are too tight. The better-than-average effect means that investors have 
overly positive views of themselves, which are unrealistic. (Nofsinger 2005.) 
 
The self-attribution bias implies that when investors make successful investment 
decisions they attribute their own skill but when the investment decisions are 
unsuccessful they blame bad luck. (Shefrin 2002:101.) 
 
Representativeness means stereotypic judgement. In financial markets it leads to errors 
in investment decisions. A good, solid company is assumed to be a good investment. 
The company generates strong earnings, has high sales growth and quality management, 
but good investments are stocks that increase in price more than others. Stocks of good 
companies could actually be worse as investments than those of other companies. 
(Shefrin 2002, Solt & Statman 1989.) 
 
Ball and Brown (1968) were the first ones who researched the post-announcement-drift. 
They concluded that after the earnings announcement, the cumulative abnormal returns 
continue increasing after good news and decreasing after bad news. George Foster, 
Chris Olsen and Terry Shevlin (1984) estimated that over 60 days after the earnings 
announcement, a long position in stocks with unexpected earnings in the highest decile 
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and a short position in stocks in lowest decile generates 25 per cent annual abnormal 
return (before transaction costs). 
 
Victor L. Bernard and Jacob K. Thomas (1989) suggested that there are two 
explanations to this anomaly. Firstly, it could be that when the CAP model is used to 
calculate abnormal returns, the model is either incomplete or misestimated and 
researchers have been unable to adjust raw returns to risk. The result is that abnormal 
returns are a fair compensation for the investor for bearing the risk, which is priced but 
not captured by the CAPM. Another explanation is that the response to new information 
is delayed. It may be caused because traders fail to assimilate available information or 
because certain costs exceed gains from immediate exploitation of information.  
 
Momentum is a phenomenon where investors try to pick stocks that have outperformed 
other stocks in the past. The idea is to buy past “winner” stocks and short-sell past 
“loser” stocks. Narasimhan Jegadeesh and Sheridan Titman (1993) bought winner 
stocks from past 6 months and kept stocks for the next 6 months, a strategy which 
generated 12.01 per cent abnormal return. (Jegadeesh & Titman 1993.) 
 
Contrarian is an investment strategy where investors buy past “loser” stocks and sell 
past “ winner” stocks. The strategy works the other way around to momentum. There is 
overreaction on the market and the “winner” stocks become over-valued and “loser” 
stocks become under-valued. Investors benefit when stock prices balance. (Chain 1988.) 
 
When new information about a share is announced, investors might react 
disproportionately, which causes share price to change dramatically, and the price 
doesn’t immediately reflect the true value of the stock after the announcement. Shefrin 
(2000) concluded that investors overreact to negative news. De Bondt and Thaler 
(1985) suggested that investors overreact to bad news and good news. This then leads 
past “loser” stocks to become overpriced and past “winners” to become underpriced. 
They also argued that overreaction is based on representativeness and a “loser” portfolio 
outperforms the market. Shefrin (2000) suggested that this phenomenon is concentrated 
in the month of January.  
 
When the stock markets increase, the investors get optimistic and assume that the 
markets will continue increasing in the future.  When people try to predict the future, 
they tend to get anchored by salient past events, so they underreact. (Shefrin 2002.) 
Security prices underreact to news, for example earnings announcements. If the news 
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are good, the stock prices continue the positive trend after the announcement, and if the 
news are bad, the stock prices continue decreasing. (Shleifer 2000.) When optimism 
reaches its highest peak, the investors’ greed moves stock prices beyond their intrinsic 
values. In extreme cases of overreaction and underreaction, these anomalies could lead 
to market panics and crashes. (Shefrin 2002.) 
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4. STOCK RETURNS 
 
 
Different factors affect stock prices. Analysts evaluate those factors and form their own 
opinions about the intrinsic value of stocks and thus use different valuation techniques. 
This chapter represents basic stock pricing and valuation models, which are generally 
used to evaluate stock prices and returns, to provide enough background in order to 
understand the analysts’ methods in forming a recommendation. 
 
 
4.1. Capital asset pricing model 
 
Capital asset pricing model (CAPM) is the most commonly known model for securities 
pricing. William Sharpe (1964), John Lintner (1965) and Jan Moss (1966) derived the 
model from Harry Markowitz’s portfolio theory (1952). The basic idea of the CAPM is 
to connect risk and return. The model ties it down that risk and return go hand in hand: 
the higher the risk, the higher the return. The model also points out that the only risk 
that affects the stock’s expected return is the systematic risk (market risk) of the stock, 
which is measured by Beta. Because firm-specific also known as unsystematic risk can 
be reduced to 0 by appropriate diversification of the portfolio, only the market risk 
matters. (Sharpe 1964; Lintner 1965; Mossin 1966.) 
 
The starting point of the CAPM is the equality between all of the investors. There are 
nine assumptions to be made that the model is being simple enough to build. 
The assumptions are (Nikkinen 2002: 68-69.): 
 
1. There are no transaction costs. It is possible to buy and sell stocks free of charge. 
Without this assumption the return of the stock would be dependent on whether the 
investor bought the stock before or after his investment decision.  
2. Investment objects are divided into minimal parts. 
3. There are no taxes. 
4. Investors cannot influence investment object prices when they buy or sell them. 
5. Investment decisions are based on portfolio theory. 
6. Short-selling is allowed. Investors can sell stocks that they don’t own. 
7. The price for lending money is the risk-free interest. 
8. Investors have homogenous expectations. Maturity of the investment is the same for 
everyone. 
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9. All of the commodities are for sale, including human capital. 
 
All of the securities in the (hypothetical) world form the market portfolio (M). Investors 
try to create their own portfolios, which correspond to the market portfolio. The amount 
of individual stocks in the market portfolio is the market value of the stock divided by 
the market value of all the stocks in the world. Figure 2 presents the market portfolio, 
which is the best efficient risk-free-return portfolio on the capital market line (which 
consists of all efficient portfolios). (Nikkinen 2002: 58-65.) 
 
Figure 2. Capital market line and the market portfolio (Bodie et al. 2009:282.) 
 
The CAPM determines the stock’s expected return by its risk-level that is measured by 
Beta. Beta estimates the market risk of the stock and shows how much the stock returns 
change when the market portfolio returns change. Beta is calculated by dividing stock 
and market covariance by market variance. 
 
(1)   
 
Where: 
 
   is the Beta of the stock i   
  is covariance of stock i  and market portfolio m 
  is the variance ( ) of the market portfolio 
βi =
Cov(ri, rm )
Var(rm )
βi
Cov(ri, rm )
σ 2Var(rm )
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Beta measures the systematic risk of the stock. Systematic risk cannot be eliminated by 
diversification. Only company-specific risk is possible to abrogate by right 
diversification of stock portfolio. (Markowitz 1952.) The CAPM states that stock return 
exceeds risk-free return of the asset by risk premium. When market risk premium is 
multiplied by stock’s Beta, the risk premium of the stock is obtained, and when the 
stock’s risk premium is combined with risk-free return, the expected return of the stock 
is derived. Thus, the CAPM is as follows (Nikkinen et al. 2002:68-76.): 
 
(2)  
 
 
Where: 
 
,   is the expected return of the stock. 
 
,   is the risk-free rate of interest. For example (in real world) interest rate 
of Finnish government bond. 
 
,   is the systematic risk of the stock.  
 
,   is the expected return of the market. 
 
,   is the market premium (Difference between expected return of the 
market and the risk-free rate). 
 
- ,   is the risk premium. 
 
Risk premium  of the market portfolio and its volatility  determine the 
investor’s individual willingness to take a risk. The equation of the CAPM forms the 
security market line, which is presented in figure 3. All of the correctly priced securities 
are on the security market line. Under the line are overvalued stocks and above the line 
are the undervalued stocks. The beta of the market is one. If the stock’s beta is 2 its 
stock price deviation is twice the market’s deviation. (Nikkinen 2002: 68-76.) 
 
E(ri ) = rf +βi E(rm )− rf"# $%
E(ri )
rf
βi
E(rm )
E(rm )− rf
E(ri ) rf
E(rm )− rf σ m
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Figure 3. Security market line (Nikkinen et al. 2002: 71.) 
 
4.1.1. Abnormal returns 
 
Abnormal returns (AR) are returns that the CAPM cannot explain. Returns are higher 
than the expected returns that CAPM estimates. Thus, abnormal returns are actual 
realised returns minus expected returns. If the sum is positive, there are abnormal 
returns generated. Cumulative abnormal return (CAR) is the sum of all abnormal returns. 
CARs are usually calculated in days, because prior research has suggested that 
compounding daily abnormal returns can create a bias in the results. (Brown & Warner, 
1985) 
 
John Y. Campbell & Andrew W. Lo & Craig A.  MacKinlay (1997) presented a 7-step 
analysis for event study evaluation. First, the event of interest and the event-test period 
(event window) are to be defined. The second step is to select criteria for the inclusion 
of given security in the study. The third step is to measure expected returns and 
abnormal returns. The abnormal return is the actual post-return of the security over the 
event window minus the expected return (CAPM) of the security. The expected return is 
the return that would realize if the event did not happen. (Step 4) When the performance 
model has been chosen, the parameters must be estimated by using a subset of the data 
known as the estimation window that is the period prior to the event window (the event 
window is not included to the estimation window, so that the event would not cause 
errors in the normal performance model parameter estimates). (step 5) This step 
determines the testing framework for abnormal returns where the null hypothesis and 
techniques for aggregating ARs of the stock are to be defined. In the sixth step the 
empirical results are presented. The seventh and the last step include interpretation and 
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conclusions. The empirical results will demonstrate the event’s impact on security 
prices. (Campbell, Lo & MacKinlay 1997.) 
 
 
4.2. Arbitrage pricing theory 
 
Arbitrage is a situation where it is possible to make profit without risk. It could be made 
by buying a security Z from market A at price x and then selling the same security to 
market B at a higher price y.  This would not be possible if the markets were efficient. 
In the real world, these price variances disappear quickly between markets when 
investors use arbitrage opportunities. (Bodie ym. 2009: 325.) 
 
Stephen Ross (1976) developed the Arbitrage pricing theory (APT). The basic 
assumption of the APT is that investors would want to increase their portfolios’ returns 
if it could be done without increasing the risk. This model tries to find under-priced 
assets on the markets and take advantage of arbitrage. The model specifies 
simultaneously affecting variables (interest-rate, Gross domestic product growth, war in 
Iraq (an oil stock)) to the asset, which follows the equation (Nikkinen et al. 2005: 76-
77; Ross 1976.): 
 
(3)   
 
Where: 
 
 are prescribed factors multiplied by the per-share sensitivities. 
 is company-specific noise. 
 
The basic idea is to model stock pricing without assumptions. The model presumes that 
the markets are not working efficiently. 
 
 
4.3. Three-factor model 
 
The arbitrage pricing model does not contain information about the amount of factors or 
which specific factors should be used when pricing stocks. Eugene F. Fama & Kenneth 
R. French (1996) concluded that a company’s size and book-to-market ratio are the 
most important company-specific factors that impact stock returns.  These factors and 
ri = E(ri )+βi1F1 +βi2F2 +...+ ei
ei
Bi1F1 Bi2F2
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market risk premium form the Three-factor model. The model calculates stock returns 
and the equation is formed as below (Fama & French 1996.): 
 
(4) 
 
Where: 
 
   is the risk premium multiplied by systematic risk. 
 
is the difference between the return on a portfolio of small stocks and 
the return on a portfolio of large stocks (SMB, small minus big) 
multiplied by ( ) sensitiveness of the return  to the factor (SMB). 
 
  is the difference between the return on a portfolio of high book-to-
market stocks and the return on portfolio of low book-to-market 
stocks (HML, high minus low) multiplied by ( ) sensitiveness of the 
return to the factor (HML). 
 
 
4.4. Valuation models 
 
This chapter presents three essential models used generally in stock valuation. 
 
4.4.1. Dividend discount model 
 
The series of valuation models began when Williams (1938) introduced the dividend 
discount model (DDM). (Penman 1998:304.) 
 
In the dividend discount model the value of the stock is the cash flow that a company 
generates in the future. Shareholders receive their part of the company’s cash flow as 
dividends. Thus, it is possible to evaluate the stock price by discounting the future 
dividends by yield to present value. This model presumes that dividend flow is eternal. 
It does not take into account the cash flow that the company’s earnings generate. For 
example, growth companies that do not pay dividend would be worthless if valuation 
was carried out applying this model. (Beneda 2003: 248.) The model is a solid tool for 
valuating a stock when a company has a solid history as a dividend payer. (Foerster & 
si
hi
E(ri )− rf = βi[E(rM )− rf ]+ siE(SMB)+ hiE(HML)
βi[E(rM )− rf ]
siE(SMB)
hiE(HML)
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Sapp 2005: 56–72.) Equation 5 presents the dividend discount model. (Barnes 2009: 29-
32) 
 
(5)    
 
 
Where: 
 
 is the intrinsic value of the share now. 
  is the required rate of return of the shares by investors. 
 is infinity. 
 are the dividend payments (t = 1, 2, 3…..n years). 
 
Another problem with the model is that it requires predicting dividend yield to infinity 
and predicting is difficult even just in the next few years. (Penman 1998: 304) Even 
slight errors in predictions cause large deviations in the results. Dividend discount 
models usually give unrealistic expectations of the dividend policy that a company 
exercises. (Dechow, Hutton & Sloan 1999: 32.) 
  
Gordon (1962) found a model for stock evaluation that assumes the dividend yield to 
increase steadily in the future. The model is a good valuation tool when a mature and 
solid company is evaluated. It applies if the dividend is smaller than the required return 
of investment. Gordon growth model is presented in equation 6. (Barnes 2009: 29-32) 
 
(6)   
 
Where: 
 
,   is the stock price 
 is dividends at the end of first year 
r ,  is the required rate of return 
g,  is the expected constant growth rate of the dividend 
 
4.4.2. Discounted cash flow 
 
Discounted cash flow (DCF) is implemented by estimating the total value of future cash 
flows, including inflowing and outflowing cash. Then cash flows are usually discounted 
P0
P0 =
D1
r − g
D1
Vo =
D1
(1+ re )1
+
D2
(1+ re )2
+
D3
(1+ re )3
+...+ Dn(1+ re )n
Vo
re
Dn
n
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using the required rate of return to present value. The aim is to estimate the total value 
of cash that the investment generates during the investment period. If the value of cash 
is higher than the cost of investment the investment is profitable. It is said that the DCF 
model is the most accurate model for valuating a company. One of the most commonly 
used DCF models is net cash flow, because it represents the cash that is possible to be 
distributed to equity owners without threatening or intervening with future operations. 
(Foerster & Sapp 2005: 48–49; Hitchner 2010:131-144.) There are two ways to estimate 
the net cash flow and it can be estimated to the equity shareholders and to invested 
capital (calculations below) (Hitchner 2010:131-133.) 
 
Net income after tax 
+ depreciation, amortization, and other non-cash changes 
- incremental working capital needs 
- incremental capital expenditure needs 
+ new debt principal in 
- repayment of debt principal 
= net cash flow direct to equity 
 
Net income after tax 
+ interest expense 
+ depreciation, amortization and other non-cash changes 
-  incremental capital expenditure needs 
-  incremental ”debt-free” working capital needs 
= net cash flow to invested capital 
 
Cash flow to invested capital is also known as free cash flow. Cash flow calculations 
preclude debt principles payment and interest expense, and thus it is a debt-free model. 
The method determines the value of invested capital that is typically equity, capital 
leases and interest-bearing debt. The invested capital method requires a suitable 
discount rate that as closely as possible corresponds to the cost of invested capital. 
Other discount rates are not applicable. (Hitchner 2010:131-133.) 
 
When net cash flow is calculated, the present value of net cash is determined by the 
discount factor. Equation 7 demonstrates the discounted net cash flow model. (Hitchner 
2010:131-144.) 
 
(7)    PV =
NCF1
(1+ k)1 +
NCF2
(1+ k)2 +...+
NCFn
(1+ k)n
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Where: 
 
NCFn  is net cash flow (Expected future economic income in the nth  or last 
period in which an element of income is expected NCF 1, 2, etc. is the 
first, second and so on expected future economic income for each 
period before nth period (or year)). 
 
PV  is the present value of net cash flows. 
k is the discount rate. 
 
4.4.3. Price-to-earnings ratio 
 
Price-to-earnings ratio (P/E ratio) is the most commonly used method for evaluating 
stocks. (Demirakos, Strong & Walker 2004.) Francis S. Nicholson (1960) was the first 
one who investigated the P/E ratio. He concluded that low P/E ratio (below 10) stocks 
(value stocks) generated more profit than high P/E ratio (over 10) stocks (growth 
stocks) over time. S. Basu (1977) 17 years later investigated the same phenomenon and 
his findings support Nicholson’s (1960) study. He also concluded that low P/E ratio 
stocks outperform high P/E ratio stocks.  
 
P/E ratio indicates how the market rates the company and its future earnings. The higher 
the P/E ratio is, the more eager investors are to pay for the company’s future earnings. 
P/E ratios vary within industries. Thus it is stated that P/E ratios between companies 
should be compared within industry and not over the industry. P/E ratio calculates how 
many years it takes for the company to pay back the invested money for a share. 
Equation 8 demonstrates the P/E ratio. (Barnes 2009: 26-29.) 
 
 
(8)   
 
Where: 
 
P  is market price of the stock. 
EPS   is earnings per share. 
 
 
P/E ratio = PEPS
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4.5. Stock returns in Finland 
 
Figure 4. Development of OMXH and OMXH24 
 
Figure 4 represents the stock prices of OMXH and the OMXH24 indexes. It can be 
noted that the stock market in Finland develops in cycles. There ha been peaks in 2000, 
2007-2008 and 2011.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Annual returns of OMXH and OMXH24 
 
The figure 5 Illustrates the annual returns of OMXH and OMXH24. The returns have 
been the highest during the dotcom bubble in 1999 and 2009 just prior the GFC. The 
average annual returns for the period of OMXH and OMXH 24 are 6% and 12% 
respectively. The large-cap stocks have a much higher returns compared to the overall 
average. This may be explained by that the larger companies also do business globally 
and therefore are more resilient during economic downturns. 
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5. ANALYSTS’ LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
For years, researchers have been interested in whether analysts are able to affect stock 
returns with their recommendations. If they are, they break the efficient market 
hypothesis. When testing the strong form of the efficient markets, it is researched 
whether some investors or groups have monopolistic rights to private information, 
which might impact stock prices. (Fama 1970.) The difference between public and 
private information is hard to define and analysts use both. They obtain private 
information by visiting companies, having special relationships to companies and 
personnel or conducting their own views (“private insight”) from public information. 
(Dimson & Marsh 1984: 1258) This chapter presents the analysts’ role in the capital 
markets, their valuation methods, forecasting accuracy, behavioral biases and previous 
studies related to their recommendations’ impact on stock returns. 
  
 
5.1. Who are the analysts? 
 
Why do the brokerage houses spend money on stock analysis? The analysts’ stock 
valuation is based on information and generally used valuation models. The efficient 
market hypothesis concludes that it shouldn’t be possible to find new information about 
a stock because the stock prices should reflect all available information (Fama 1970). 
Despite the efficient market hypothesis, brokerage houses spend hundreds of millions of 
dollars every year to analyse stocks in order to prove to investors that some stocks are 
better (worse) than others. (Womack 1996:138.) Because operators on the capital 
market are paying for the recommendations and forecasts, which the analysts produce, 
the information is concluded to be valuable for investors. (Brown & Rozeff 1978.) The 
critical questions answered in this chapter are how the analysts manage to create 
investment value with their opinions, and how their recommendations impact on stock 
returns. 
 
Analysts are operators on the financial market who produce new information for 
investors. They are responsible for almost all of the new research done on the capital 
markets. In the produced information analysts try to forecast what is going to happen on 
the markets in the future. Companies’ earnings forecasts, reports on specific companies, 
and sector and industry analysis are examples of the information the analysts produce. 
Based on these future forecasts, analysts make stock recommendations. Usually there 
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are five levels of stock recommendations, which are Sell, Underperform, Hold, Buy and 
Strong Buy. In addition to recommendations, the analysts give target prices on specific 
stocks. The target price duration is generally 12 months, but it could also be 1, 3, 6 or 
24 months. (Dimson & Marsh 1984: 1257.)  
 
Analysts’ recommendation levels indicate their own opinion about the firm’s value. 
Recommendations express their expectations about the stock’s near-term (usually 12 
months) return performance. High recommendations (Buy, Strong Buy) indicate that the 
stock is undervalued on the market and the expected return of the stock is higher 
compared to other stocks. Low recommendations (Sell, Underperform) suggest that the 
stock is overvalued and future earnings will be lower compared to other stocks. 
(Jegadeesh, Kim, Krische & Lee 2004.)  
 
Analysts generally concentrate on one industry and make recommendations within the 
industry on approximately 20 stocks. The amount of economical information has 
increased during past years. This has forced analysts to become so-called specialists in 
relatively small areas on the stock market, thus covering only a small segment of the 
stock market. (Nandelstadh 2003: 1.)  
 
Hemang Desai (2000) concluded that analysts who are able to create solid personal 
relationships to their clients are highly valued. On the other hand, he suggested that if 
analysts’ forecasts are continuously wrong, they are never seen as “good” analysts.  
Therefore their recommendations cannot be used for investment decisions. There are 
two different analyst types operating on the market: buy-side analysts and sell-side 
analysts. Buy-side analysts work for asset management companies and make internal 
recommendations and forecasts exclusively to money managers. There is little research 
done on buy-side analysts. (Yingmei, Liu, & Qian 2006.) Sell-side analysts are 
employed by brokerage firms and provide research for the firm’s brokers and clients.  
The public also have access to their earnings forecasts and stock recommendations. 
Therefore it is suggested that sell-side analysts’ research has investment value. (Elton, 
Gruber and Grossman 1986, Stickel 1995, Womack 1996, Barber Lehavy, McNichols 
and Trueman 2001 and Li 2005.) This thesis deals only with sell-side analysts’ 
recommendations. 
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Analysts produce earnings forecasts, target price forecasts, stock recommendations and 
qualitative reports of companies’ prospects (3.1). Analysts also develop expertise (3.2) 
and in order to produce recommendations and future forecasts they analyze information 
from different sources, for example earnings and other information from SEC filings 
(proxy statements, periodic financial reports, industry and macroeconomic conditions 
along with management communications and other information). Investors then use the 
information that analysts produce to make trading decisions that affect market prices 
(3.3). If the capital markets are efficient, the market prices should immediately reflect 
all of the information. If not, the inefficiencies create analyst forecast errors and 
changes in stock prices that can be predicted (3.4). The analysts’ decision process and 
research output depend on regulatory and institutional factors that vary over time and 
across countries (3.5). Analysts’ economic incentives and behavioural biases must also 
be taken into account (3.6). At last, the research design issues that constrain the 
researcher's ability to observe the forces that ultimately drive market prices are created 
by the limitations associated with archival databases, econometric tools, and 
mathematical models (3.7). (Ramnath & Rock & Shane 2008.) Figure 6 demonstrates 
the analysts’ decision process and their research output. 
Figure 6. Analysts’ decision making processes and research output (Ramnath & Rock 
& Shane 2008.) 
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5.2. How do the analysts forecast? 
 
“Virtually all Wall Street (sell-side) analysts take an industry perspective in coming up 
with the valuations, including earnings estimates and recommendations, which they 
provide to investors.” (Bodi & Womack 2006.) 
 
Analysts use different stock valuation models in order to evaluate and determine the 
stock price. By this evaluation they are able to give stock recommendations. Most 
commonly used evaluation model for stock valuation among analysts was the Price-to-
earnings ratio (P/E). It was also concluded that other approaches are important as well, 
for example the dividend yield. (Arnold & Moizer 1984.) 
 
Richard G. Barker (1999) documented that the P/E ratio dominates dividend yield as a 
valuation model used by analysts for companies in the services, industrials and 
consumer goods stock market sectors, but the dividend yield dominates financials and 
utilities sectors. It was concluded that services, industrials and consumer goods stocks 
are “P/E valued” and financials and utilities stocks are “yield valued”. This research 
suggests that the analysts choose their valuation models by the stock market sector, 
which they are analysing. (Barker 1999.) 
 
Efthimios G. Demirakos, Norman C. Strong & Martin Walker (2004) researched the 
analysts’ valuation methods. Their study material was obtained from 104 analysts’ 
reports from international investment banks. Stock sectors analysed in reports were 
beverages, electronics and pharmaceuticals. Their study concluded that analysts use 
comparative valuation more in the beverages sector than in electronics or 
pharmaceuticals sectors. Analysts also use the P/E model or an explicit multi-period 
Discounted-Cash-Flow model (DCF) as their main valuation model, but there were no 
analysts who used the price to cash flow as main valuation model. A limited group of 
analysts who construct explicit multi-period valuation models used a comparative 
model as their dominant valuation model. It was also concluded, like earlier in Barker’s 
(1999) research, that the analysts tailor their valuation models for the specific stock 
market sector, which they are analysing. (Demirakos, Strong & Walker 2004.)  
 
Nancy L. Beneda’s (2003) research suggests that analysts should pay more attention to 
the operative efficiency of a company in their valuations.  Today, valuation is too 
strongly based on earnings and thus the use of free cash flows is recommended and 
justified. (Beneda 2003: 249-250.) 
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One of the most recent studies on analysts’ valuation methods was conducted by 
Shamed Imam, Richard Barker and Colin Clubb (2008). They examined UK investment 
analysts’ use of valuation models. Their study data came from interviews of 35 sell-side 
analysts from 10 leading investment banks, who provided 98 equity research reports for 
FTSE-100 companies, and 7 buy-side analysts from 3 asset management firms. They 
found that discounted cash flow (DCF) and other more complex models have become 
significantly more important than previous studies have suggested.  They also suggest 
that “unsophisticated” valuation multiples, in particular the price-to-earnings ratio (P/E), 
have remained important. The technical applicability of DCF is rather limited, which 
causes analysts to rely on valuation multiples and their own subjective judgement. 
Consequently, the analysts rely on DCF on rare occasions when determining target 
prices and stock recommendations. Finally, it was concluded that the analysts’ actual 
use of valuation models requires them to understand social and economic context and 
motivations, although the literature concentrates on technical merits of alternative 
valuation models. (Imam, Barker & Clubb 2008.) 
 
Imam, Barker & Clubb (2008) also made a survey for 35 sell-side analysts to find out 
which valuation model they would prefer. Their survey suggests that the P/E and DCF 
models dominate. The economic value added (EVA) and the dividend discount model 
(DDM) were rated to be less important. Unsophisticated and accruals-based models 
were ranked important if they involved cash flow or earnings - if not, they were not 
relevant tools for analysts. In the other panel, Imam et al. (2008) collected the valuation 
models, which were used in equity reports (98 reports). They found that DCF was used 
in 49 reports out of 98. P/E was used in 45 and EV/EBITDA in 25. Results support the 
findings in research interviews. 
 
 
5.3. Can the analysts forecast? 
 
Alfred Cowles (1993) was the first one who studied the analysts’ ability to forecast and 
the impact of their recommendations on stock returns. He concluded that the analysts’ 
forecasting ability is poor and there is no impact on stock prices caused by their 
recommendations. John Cragg & Burton G. Malkiel (1968) concluded that analyst 
forecasts are not more accurate than the time series models and that BJ models produce 
more accurate forecasts than martingale and submartingale models. They also suggested 
that Value Line Investment Survey makes more accurate forecasts than the BJ and naive 
time series models. However, Brown & Rozeff (1978) studied the fact that brokerage 
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houses are spending millions of dollars every year on stock analysis. They presumed 
that analysts must have superior capability to forecast returns. Their research indicate 
that analysts produce more accurate forecasts than time series models. (Brown & Rozeff 
1978.) 
 
Sanford Grossman and Joseph Stiglitz (1980) concluded that market prices do not 
reflect all of the information there is. If they did, the data gatherers couldn’t get enough 
compensation for their expensive business. Money for data gathering comes from 
underwriting fees, trading profits, and commissions from securities trading. Therefore 
the brokerage company should be paid only if the expected return from the investment 
advice is worth as much as for the cost of the advice. A logical source of value for 
investors could be excess stock returns which are caused by the analysts’ changes in 
stock recommendations. (Grossman & Stiglitz 1980.) 
 
Many studies have been made about the analysts’ capability to forecast, the accuracy of 
their forecasts and the value of their investment information. For example, Hemang 
Desai and Prem C. Jain (1995) analysed Barron’s Roundtable recommendations for 24 
years and received a result which concluded that investors do not benefit from analysts’ 
advise. Michael B. Clement (1999) researched the reasons for the accuracy differences 
between different analysts’ earnings forecasts. He used the I/B/E/S (Institutional brokers’ 
estimate system) detail history database for his research and concluded that forecast 
accuracy is positively associated with the analysts’ experience and the size of their 
employer. Experience here refers to surrogate for the analysts’ ability and skill, and 
employer size refers to a surrogate for resources available.  Forecast accuracy is 
negatively associated with the number of companies and industries followed by the 
analysts, which refers to task complexity. The results suggest that the characteristics of 
the analysts may explain the differences in the forecasting accuracy. (Clement 1999.) 
 
Kent L. Womack (1996) concluded that the analysts’ forecasting ability is based on the 
right timing and short-term stock picks when giving buy recommendations. Forecasting 
ability in Sell recommendations is based on right timing, short-term stock picks, and the 
right choice of industry. The Sell recommendations were much more accurate than buy 
recommendations. (Womack 1996.) 
 
It is also relevant to ask, whose information should be trusted. There are huge 
differences between analysts. Age was found to be one factor. Harrison Hong, Jeffrey D. 
Kubik, and Amit Solomon (2000) argued in their research that older analysts were more 
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accurate than younger ones in their forecasts. This supports Clements’ (1999) research, 
which concluded that analysts experience affects the forecasting accuracy. Also, if the 
analysts’ forecast accuracy was good in the past, it would positively affect their 
forecasting abilities in the future, findings are supported by Clement and Senyo Y. Tse 
(2005). They also argued that forecast frequency positively affected analysts’ 
forecasting abilities. 
 
Narasimhan Jegadeesh, Joonghyuk Kim, Susan D. Krische & Charles M. C. Lee (2004) 
noticed that quarterly change in consensus recommendations is a reliable return 
forecaster. Their research clarifies that the explanatory power of the change in analysts’ 
consensus recommendation is stronger than that of the level of the recommendation. 
Changes in recommendations during the previous quarter explained the future returns, 
when used separately or in conjunction with other predictive signals. This research 
suggests that the return-relevant information contained in analyst recommendation 
changes does not correlate with other information. One explanation for this is that the 
recommendation change contains qualitative information (for example managerial 
abilities, strategic alliances, intangible assets, or other growth opportunities) that other 
signals do not. (Jegadeesh, Kim, Krische & Lee 2004.) 
 
 
5.4. Analysts’ behaviour studies 
 
De bondt and Thaler (1990) suggest in their research that analyst forecasts are too 
optimistic and extreme, especially if the forecasts are made 2 years in the future. 
Therefore, they concluded that the markets are not rational. Jeffrey S. Abarbanell and 
Victor L. Bernard (1992) found that the reason for analyst forecasting errors is that 
analysts do not fully process the latest changes in earnings per share. They conclude that 
security analysts are more likely to underreact than overreact to news. 
 
There had been concerns in financial press that a professional relationship between an 
analyst and an underwriting company creates overly optimistic investment 
recommendations. For example analysts from Morgan Stanley have stated that the 
bankers in Morgan Stanley have pressured them to alter negative research reports on the 
stocks of the firm's corporate clients, especially those for which it did stock 
underwriting deals. (Siconolfi 1992.) Hsiou-Wei Lina and Maureen F. McNichols’s 
(1998) research compared earnings forecasts and recommendations from underwriter 
analysts, co-underwriter analysts and unaffiliated analysts. They concluded that 
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underwriter and co-underwriter analysts’ earnings forecasts and recommendations are 
more favourable than those of unaffiliated analysts but generally their near-term growth 
forecasts are not. Their findings also state that there are no differences in post-
announcement returns associated with underwriter and unaffiliated analysts’ 
recommendations. This indicates that it does not matter whether investors follow 
recommendations of affiliated or unaffiliated analysts. A significant difference was 
found in the Hold recommendation, which was interpreted as a more negative signal if 
the recommendation came from an underwriter rather than an unaffiliated analyst. (Lina 
& McNichols’s 1998.) 
 
John C. Easterwood and Stacey R. Nutt (1999) researched overreaction and 
underreaction among analysts. They assumed that if analysts systematically underreact 
to news, they act irrationally or continuously misinterpret the news.  Misinterpretation 
also suggests that the analysts overreact to news. On the other hand, their continuous 
optimism implies that they underreact to negative earnings news and overreact to 
positive news. They found evidence of underreaction and overreaction in the capital 
market. Evidence was also found from analysts not being irrational and not revising 
their forecasts enough when the forecast news is negative. When the forecast news is 
positive, they increase their forecasts too much. (Eastwood & Nutt 1999.) 
 
Francis Kim Hansog and Christos Pantzalis (2003) researched analyst herding between 
years 1980 and 1998. They concluded that the more diversified the company the 
analysts are analysing is, the more herding among analysts will occur. They also 
concluded that the harder the analysing job is, the more herding there is among analysts. 
Herding decreases the market value of the company evaluated. (Hansog & Pantzalis 
2003.) Rick A. Cooper & Theodore E. Day & Craig M. Lewis. (2001) investigated the 
timing between analysts who herd and those who do not. They suggested that the lead 
analysts issue the most informative forecasts when forecast accuracy, stock price 
response or abnormal trading volume is used to identify informative forecasts. They 
also suggest that analysts who know they are not such good forecasters have a tendency 
to follow the forecasts of lead analysts. (Cooper, Day & Lewis 2001) 
 
Douglas E. Stevens & Arlington W. Williams. (2004) found evidence in their research 
that suggests analysts to anchor to their own forecasts when they actually should revise 
them. Ling Cen, Gilles Hilary and John K. C. Wei (2013) concluded that analysts use 
the industry median forecast as an anchor. They implemented the study by interviewing 
six security analysts to find out, which valuation tools they would use to forecast 
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earnings per share. Thus the amount of stocks of a company within an industry 
determines the factors for analysts’ forecasts. 
 
 
5.5. Analysts’ recommendations and stock returns 
 
Alfred Cowles (1933) made the first research about analysts. 45 professional agencies 
attempted to forecast the future movement of the stock market. The first part of the 
research dealt with the attempts of 20 fire insurance companies from year 1928 to 1931 
and 16 financial services companies between years 1928 to 1932. They tried to foretell 
which stocks turn out to be the most profitable. The second part tested the foretelling 
skills of 24 financial publications. They attempted to forecast the future course of the 
stock market.  
 
How did they manage? The first part’s success was poor; only six of 16 financial 
services were successful. The average annual effective rate of all the services was -1.43 
per cent. Only 6 out of the 20 fire insurance companies succeeded in foretelling. The 
average annual effective rate of the 20 fire insurance companies was -4.72 per cent. 
Return of the selected stocks was only 1.20 per cent. The foretelling success of the 24 
financial publications was weak as well; only one third was successful. The research 
concludes that the analysts’ forecasting skills were not trustworthy between years 1928-
1932 and their recommendations didn’t have significant effects on stock returns. 
(Cowles 1933.) 
 
John D. Stoffels (1966) studied the short-term effect of analyst recommendations on 
stock prices and stock returns. He presumed in his research that Buy recommendations 
made by investment advisory service have an effect on the demand of individual stocks. 
It was also concluded that only the retail investors were responsible for the increase in 
demand of individual stocks. Professional and institutional investors wouldn’t buy the 
stock just because of the analyst recommendations. They might get interested in the 
recommended stock but they would make more research and valuations about the stock 
before buying it. (Stoffels 1966.) 
 
Stoffels (1966) concluded in his research that analyst recommendations have a positive 
effect on stock price for three or four days after the recommendation is published. In 
some cases the effect lasted even ten or eleven days from the announcement. There are 
many explanations for this phenomenon: for example, the investors’ underlying 
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confidence in the investment advisory service and enthusiasm to be in the market, 
which leads them to accept any recommendation just because they want to be in the 
game. Another explanation is that an investor is already interested in a certain stock and 
has valuated it. When an analyst makes a recommendation on the stock, it strengthens 
the investor’s view and the stock is bought. (Stoffels 1966:85-86.) 
 
Kent L. Womack (1996) studied the effects of the analysts’ Buy and Sell 
recommendations on stock returns. Recommendations for his study were gathered from 
security analysts at major U.S. brokerage firms. Womack (1996) concluded that stock 
returns follow post-announcement drift (post-recommendation stock price drift in this 
case). When an analyst publishes a buy recommendation, the stock immediately begins 
to generate abnormal returns and continues to increase to a level where the stock price is 
equal to the new information, which the recommendation included. The reaction is the 
same, but in the opposite direction, if it is a Sell recommendation that the analyst issues. 
(Womack 1996:138.) 
 
Womack (1996) concluded the stock price reaction to be permanent and not quickly 
mean-reverting. This conclusion is the opposite of the one arrived at by Brad M. Barber 
& Douglas Loeffler (1993). Abnormal returns generated by Buy recommendations 
realized in one month (+2.4 per cent) but Sell recommendations returns realized in six 
months after recommendations were given (-9.1 per cent). Womack also stated that 
price-reactions in Sell recommendations were stronger than in buy recommendations. 
This all means that the investors underreact to the information when a new 
recommendation is given and that is the reason stocks continue to generate abnormal 
returns for several days after the announcement. Womack also found out that analysts 
issue Buy recommendations seven times more than Sell recommendations. Findings 
imply that the analysts are reluctant to give Sell recommendations. The reason for this is 
the cost of issuing recommendations; it is cheaper to make a Buy recommendation. 
(Womack 1996: 138.) 
 
The consensus recommendation is formed by gathering all the recommendations (Buy, 
Sell, Hold) there are to a whole, and by identifying the main points of the 
recommendations. The recommendations are ranked from number 1 to 5 to correspond 
to the recommendation. Numbering technique of consensus recommendation is 
demonstrated below. 
 
Sell (Strong Sell) = 5 
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Underperform (Sell) (4) 
Hold = 3 
Buy (2) 
Strong Buy = 1 
 
From the table we can calculate the consensus recommendation. If there are 3*Sell + 
4*Hold + 3*Strong Buy, the consensus recommendation would be (3*5+4*3+3*1) /10 = 
3 = Hold. The result is rounded to the closest integer, which means that the result only 
can be 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5. (Jegadeesh, Kim, Krische & Lee 2004: 1089-1093.) 
 
Jegadeesh et al. (2004) researched the effect of analyst consensus recommendations on 
stock returns. Targets of the research were new and existing recommendations. They 
concluded that sell-side firms’ analysts prefer so-called “glamour” stocks in their 
recommendations. Glamour stocks have positive momentum, high growth, high volume, 
and they are relatively expensive (High P/E). Recommended stocks correlate positively 
with momentum but negatively with contrarian. They also concluded that the 
recommendations add value only to value (low P/E) and positive momentum stocks. 
Among recommended glamour stocks, higher consensus recommendations are 
associated with worse future returns. One reason to this phenomenon could be that 
positive analyst recommendations might just help delay the eventual decrease of 
glamour stock price to the right fundamental price. (Jegadeesh, Kim, Krische & Lee 
2004.) 
 
One of the latest studies related to analyst recommendations’ effect on stock returns is 
Moshirian, Ng & Wu’s research on emerging markets. The research contained 
recommendation data, stock return data and accounting data from thirteen emerging 
countries from 1996 to 2005. They examined post-recommendation Buy and Hold 
abnormal returns. They concluded that (see Womack 1996 p. 34) recommended stocks 
reacted significantly and immediately when the recommendation was issued. Reaction 
continued for the next couple of days after the announcement. Observations were the 
same, whether there was a new recommendation issued or if there was a change in 
recommendation. Researchers presented some facts implying that investors could 
benefit from reacting immediately to the analyst recommendations and obtain abnormal 
returns. Abnormal returns in the emerging markets are generated because of the 
asymmetries in information. (Moshirian, Ng & Wu 2009: 82.) 
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Previously presented results were compared to same studies, which were made in G7-
countires. The post-recommendation abnormal returns in emerging market countries 
were higher than in G7-countries. Therefore investors require higher risk-premium on 
emerging markets because they suffer from abnormal expenses, which are explained by 
information availability problems, liquidity problems and risks in the investors’ safety. 
In emerging countries much more Buy recommendations than Sell recommendations 
were given. (Moshirian, Ng & Wu 2009.) 
 
Moshirian et al. (2009) identified the Market-to-book (M/B) ratio to be the most 
important indicator in valuating stock recommendations. The higher the M/B ratio, the 
more valuable the recommendation is. The post-recommendation Buy-and-Hold 
abnormal returns correlate positively with the M/B ratio. It was also concluded that the 
analysts prefer positive momentum stocks in their recommendations. Researchers point 
out the fact that common factors in emerging markets such as law, transparency of the 
markets, economic development and the protection of the investors could affect the 
analysts’ recommendations. 
 
Roger K. Loh and René M. Stulz (2011) investigated when the changes in analyst 
recommendations are influential. They concluded that in *I/B/E/S, only 10 per cent of 
the recommendation changes are influential and 25 per cent of the analysts never make 
an impact to stock prices with their recommendations. They also concluded that a large 
impact causes a paradigm shift after a recommendation is issued. Investors might 
change their evaluation of a firm because of a change in recommendation. The study 
suggests that the influential recommendation change is more likely to come from 
analysts with larger leader-follower ratios, large brokers, away-from-consensus 
revisions, issued contemporaneously with earnings forecasts, and more experienced 
analysts. (Loh & Stulz 2011.) 
 
*The I/B/E/S (International Brokers’ estimate system) is a database of analyst earnings 
estimates. The database began to collect estimates in 1976 and ever since it has been 
used as a tool for researchers as they have tried to prove that it might be possible to gain 
abnorml returns by following analysts’ forecast changes. Today the database is owned 
by Thomson Reuters. (Thomson Reuters 2013.) 
 
5.5.1. Factors that impact stock price reaction 
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Scott E. Stickel (1995) made a function model about the impact analyst 
recommendations have on stock prices. He presented that the price reaction that 
followed the new analyst recommendation could be formed to a function. The function 
consists of the reputation of the analyst, the marketing ability of the brokerage house, 
the strength of the recommendation, differences in the information environments of the 
companies recommended, simultaneously issued earnings forecast revisions, and the 
magnitude of the change in recommendation. Functions are introduced more closely 
below. 
 
The better the analyst’s reputation is, the stronger the impact is on stock prices. To 
measure the reputation of the analyst, Stickel (1995) used Institutional Investor (II)’s 
All America Research Team list, where the analysts were ranked. The more the analysts 
received votes from treasurers, the better their rank was. Stickel’s (1995) hypothesis 
assumed that the effect of the Buy or Sell recommendation given by an analyst on the 
All-America Research Team list was stronger than one given by an analyst not on the 
list. (Stickel 1995: 29.) 
 
The marketing ability of the brokerage house means that the bigger the brokerage house 
is, the more sales persons they have. This implies that they also have a better marketing 
ability and they are able to assure investors of their superior stock recommendations. 
Now investors trust their recommendations and when they change their 
recommendation, the effect on stock prices is stronger. (Stickel 1995: 29.) 
 
The strength of the recommendation means that is the underlying recommendation 
Underperform or Sell for example, where Sell is the stronger recommendation. 
Underperform means that the stock is slightly overpriced and Sell implies that the stock 
is strongly overpriced. Therefore, if an analyst gives an Underperform recommendation, 
the effect on stock price is not as strong as if the recommendation was Sell. If an analyst 
issues a Strong Buy recommendation, the effect on stock price is stronger than if the 
analyst gives a Buy recommendation. (Stickel 1995: 28.) 
 
Differences in the information environments of the companies recommended affects the 
price reaction considering the fourth hypothesis that the smaller companies have bigger 
price reaction in Buy and Sell recommendations than bigger companies. It was 
concluded that the information is less relatively gathered and processed from small 
companies than big companies. Therefore new single information about small 
companies has a stronger effect on stock price. (Stickel 1995: 29.) 
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Stickel (1995: 30) found out from previous research that simultaneously issued earnings 
forecast revisions and stock recommendations both affect stock prices. For example, if 
there is a Buy recommendation given for a Nokia share, the recommendation causes a 
price reaction, but if there is a simultaneously issued positive earnings forecast revision 
on Nokia, it causes the price reaction to be stronger. This stated that if there is a positive 
recommendation standing but not a simultaneously positive (for example, negative) 
earnings forecast, the effect on stock prices is not as strong as if a positive earnings 
forecast was issued. (Stickel 1995: 30.) 
 
The magnitude of the change in recommendation is measured in recommendation levels. 
When a stock’s recommendation changes from Sell to Buy, the magnitude of the change 
in recommendation is 3 levels and if the change from Underperform to Hold, the change 
would only be one level. Stickel (1995) concluded that the three-level (SellàBuy) 
“jump” has a stronger impact on stock price than a one-level (UnderperformàHold) 
“jump”. (Stickel 1995: 28) 
 
Stickel (1995) then concluded that the strength of the recommendation, marketing 
ability of the brokerage house and simultaneously issued earnings forecast revisions are 
related to permanent stock price change. These permanent changes are called 
information effects. In turn, the magnitude of the change in recommendation, the 
marketing ability of the brokerage house and the reputation of the analyst seem to only 
influence temporary price reactions. 
 
5.5.2. Value Line studies 
 
Value Line is one of the largest independent financial research companies in the world. 
It collects data and analyses approximately 8,000 stocks, 15,000 mutual funds, 80,000 
options and other securities. The company has almost 80 years of experience in tracking, 
analysing and ranking securities. They publish a great deal of studies and reports but the 
most commonly known study is The Value Line investment survey, published weekly. 
It is a wide source of information and recommendations on approximately 1,700 stocks 
in 98 industries, the stock market and the economy. The basic idea of the survey is that 
it ranks the stocks by performance from 1 (the best) to 5 (the worst). Rank 1 stocks are 
expected to perform the best and rank 5 the worst in the next 12 months. There have 
been made multiple researches on The Value Line Investment Survey stock returns. 
(Value Line 2013.  
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Stickel (1985) investigated the stock’s change in ranking on The Value Line Investment 
Survey and how it affects stock prices. He concluded that the change in ranking affects 
stock prices but the strength of the price reaction depends on the type of the change. 
Ranking change from rank 2 to rank 1 has the largest price reaction. A cross-sectional 
analysis finds that small-cap stocks have a stronger price reaction to the rank change 
than large-cap stocks. This finding supports theories on the frequency of report arrival 
and precision of information. A speed of adjustment test suggests that the prices of the 
securities adjust to the rank change information over a multiple-day period (see 
Womack 1996 p. 34). (Stickel 1985.) 
 
James Choi (2000) researched the information produced by Value Line Investment 
Survey rankings and the performance of the stocks presented in the Survey from 1965 
to 1996. He used time series and regression analyses and compared the rankings to 
benchmark portfolios corresponding to their size, book-to-market, and momentum 
characteristics. He found evidence that the Survey’s recommendations, especially stocks 
ranked number 1 or 2, do perform better than the market. On the other hand, when he 
reduced the transaction costs from stock returns, it was doubtful whether there were any 
abnormal returns generated from the recommendations. The success of rank 1 and 2 
stocks was caused by market friction, which prevents pricing errors to ameliorate. This 
conclusion suggests that small firms have the most market friction and that is why they 
realize a great amount of abnormal returns. Value Line Investment Survey’s 
recommendations were not able to help investors to gain significant abnormal returns 
from large company stocks. (Choi 2000.) 
 
5.5.3. Dartboard studies 
 
The Wall Street Journal’s “Dartboard” column, published monthly since 1988, contains 
stock recommendations from four analysts chosen by the paper. The recommended 
stocks are then compared to randomly picked stocks. Barber and Loeffler (1993) were 
the first ones to make research from Dartboard column’s data to measure stock returns 
and trading volume behaviour from October 1988 to October 1990.  They had two 
hypotheses to test. The first one was the price pressure hypothesis, which assumed that 
a Buy recommendation of a stock creates a temporary buy pressure among naive 
investors. This buy pressure then generates observed abnormal returns. Secondly, their 
information hypothesis assumed that analyst recommendations reveal new information 
about stocks and therefore the abnormal returns following recommendations suggest 
that the stocks should be re-evaluated. 
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Barber and Loeffler (1993) concluded that recommended stocks generated 
approximately 4.06 per cent abnormal return in two days post-recommendation (the day 
when a new recommendation was issued and the next trading day after the 
recommendation). Randomly picked stocks did not show any signs of excess returns in 
the same period. They also noticed that the price pressure of the recommended stocks 
reversed between second and the 25th day from the recommendation. During that time 
the stocks generated negative abnormal return of 2.08 per cent, while the randomly 
picked stocks generated none. (Barber & Loeffler 1993.) 
 
This research suggested that stocks with the highest trading volumes on the day the 
recommendations were issued have the largest positive price reaction and later the 
strongest price decrease. This observation is in line with the price pressure hypothesis. 
Considering all the observations, Barber and Loeffler (1993) concluded that a certain 
type of investor buys stocks, which are recommended by analysts. This buy pressure 
leads to temporary increase in stock prices. Only a part of the stock’s price increase is 
permanent, which suggests that the analyst recommendations do contain some new 
information. (Barber & Loeffler 1993.) 
 
Bing Liang (1999) studied the “Dartboard” column’s recommendations’ impact on 
stock prices and whether the impact was short-term or long-term from January 1990 to 
September 1994. The data consisted of 208 buy recommendations and 8 Sell 
recommendations. The performance of these 216 stocks was then compared to that of 
201 randomly picked ones. Market return was calculated using the daily stock prices 
announced by the Center for Research in Security Prices. Stock returns were followed 
over a six-month period. His research showed 3.52 per cent abnormal return 2 days after 
the recommendation was issued. Expert analysts with previous success in stock 
recommendations generated 5.34 per cent abnormal returns in the same period.  
 
His study suggests that naive investors rely on successful and experienced analysts in 
their investment decisions. His findings support the price pressure hypothesis. Liang 
(1999) concluded that the price reaction is reversed between the second and the 15th 
trading day (see Barber & Loeffler 1993). He found that in a six-month period the 
cumulative abnormal returns were approximately 23.8 per cent. Finally, Liang (1999) 
suggests that there is information leakage on the market because just before the day the 
new recommendation is issued, the abnormal returns, cumulative abnormal returns and 
trading volumes are all positive. 
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5.5.4. Analyst recommendations investment strategies 
 
Brad Barber, Reuven Lehavy, Maureen McNichols, Brett Trueman (2001) documented 
that buying (short-selling) stocks with the most (least) favourable analysts’ consensus 
recommendations, combined with daily portfolio management and immediate response 
to recommendation changes generate over 4 per cent annual abnormal returns. Returns 
diminish with less frequent portfolio management and slow reaction to recommendation 
changes. The abnormal returns remain significant for the least favourably recommended 
stocks. They also documented that to execute analyzed strategies efficiently the 
recommended stocks in portfolio must have high trading volumes. (Barber, Lehavy, 
McNichols & Trueman 2001.) 
 
There were two portfolios formed from analyst consensus recommendations. The first 
portfolio contained the most favourably recommended stocks and the second one 
contained the least favourable recommended stocks. When analysts changed their 
recommendations or issued new recommendations, the consensus recommendation of 
the stock was re-calculated and the stock was transferred to another portfolio if was 
necessary. The re-balancing of the portfolios was done in the end of each trading day. 
The most favourably recommended stock portfolio’s return was 18.8 per cent and the 
least favourably recommended was 5.78 per cent.  Capital balanced market portfolio 
made a total return of 14.5 per cent in the same period. Therefore the most favourably 
recommended stocks generated total of 4.17 per cent gross abnormal return when 
market risk, stock sizes, book-to-market ratio and price momentum were taken in 
concern. The effect was pronounced in small firms. (Barber, Lehavy, McNichols & 
Trueman 2001.) 
 
Leslie Boni and Kent Womack (2006) investigated the analysts’ ability to take industry 
into consideration in (Buy and Sell) stock recommendations. They concluded that 
analysts’ ability to rank stocks within the industry creates value. Investment strategy 
that is based on industry improves the return-to-risk ratio significantly and diminishes 
the reversal of the stock price when comparing to portfolios, which do not exploit 
industry-based strategies. Investment strategy is implemented by buying stocks with 
buy recommendation and short-selling stocks with Sell recommendation within the 
same industry. This strategy generates approximately 1.23 per cent monthly return, 
which is 30 per cent more than strategies without exploiting the industry factor. Even 
after Fama & French (1996) risk-adjusted factors (Excess returns divided by returns’ 
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volatility) the abnormal returns monthly were 0.49 per cent. Returns were almost double 
compared to a portfolio that did not benefit from the industry-based strategy. (Bodi & 
Womack 2006.) 
 
 
5.6. Summary of the literature review 
 
Fama (1998) presented overreaction to be reason for unexplained stock price changes 
and the reverse of price changes over time. Barber & Loeffler (1993) and Liang (1999) 
study supports Fama’s hypothesis. However, there also is evidence of permanent price 
changes caused by analyst recommendations, presented by Womack (1996) and Stickel 
(1995).  
 
Overall, Value Line studies suggest that it is not possible to benefit from analyst 
recommendations. On the contrary, Dartboard studies suggest that significant abnormal 
returns are generated, but it is controversial whether the price reaction is reversed over 
time. Stickel (1985) concluded that there is a pattern determining whether the price 
reaction is permanent or temporary. 
 
Barber et al. (2001) and Bodi & Womack (2006) studies indicate that it is possible to 
make money by fixedly following analyst consensus recommendations and their 
recommendations within industry. They documented evidence of abnormal returns 
generated. 
 
There is prior evidence that analyst recommendations impact stock returns. It remains 
unclear whether the impact is permanent or temporary. However, there is indication that 
there is a price reaction and that analyst recommendations generate abnormal returns. 
Studies suggest that it is an anomaly that follows the so-called post-recommendation 
drift. Studies imply that the reason for the anomaly is underreaction to positive 
recommendations, overreaction to negative recommendations and the investors’ delayed 
response to recommendations. There are also studies that simply conclude that analysts 
are superior forecasters and able to beat the market. 
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6. DATA 
 
 
6.1. Sources and methods of collecting 
 
The analyst recommendations that are used in this thesis are provided by Thomson 
Reuters database. The recommendations are gathered from 1999 to the end of 2014.  
This study is utilized on the basis of analysts’ consensus recommendations and mean of 
target prices. Consensus recommendation is the recommendation mean of all of the 
outstanding recommendations from distinct banks or brokerage houses. The 
recommendation scale is as follows 1= Strong Buy, 2= Buy, 3= Hold, 4= Sell and 5= 
Strong Sell. Mean target price is the mean of all of the outstanding target prices there is 
for a certain stock given by analysts 12 months into the future. 
 
This study covers 24 of the largest firms that are listed in the Helsinki stock exchange. 
The original data consisted of 25 of the largest companies, however, Valmet was 
dropped from the sample due to insufficient data from the past 15-year period compared 
to the others. Thus it could bias the sample. The below table 1 presents the 24-largest 
companies which are under examination in this thesis. 
 
Amer Sports Konecranes Outotec 
Cargotec Metso Sampo A 
Elisa Neste Oil Stora Enso 
Fortum Nokia Teliasonera 
Huhtamäki Nokian Renkaat Tieto Oyj 
Kemira Nordea Bank FDR UPM-Kymmene 
Kesko B Orion B Wärtsilä 
Kone B Outokumpu YIT 
Table 1. OMXH24 stocks 
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7. METHODOLOGY, APPROACH & MODEL 
 
 
This study concentrates on examining is it possible to obtain statistically significant 
abnormal returns by following analyst recommendations of the 24 largest Finnish stocks 
on the Finnish stock market. This is investigated by constructing three portfolios Buy, 
Hold and Sell on the basis of analysts’ recommendations, which are then updated 
monthly and benchmarked with OMXH and OMXH24 indices. The OMXH24 index is 
constructed by holding all of the 24 stocks in the “OMXH24” portfolio. The second 
object of examination is the shared characteristics of the stocks with the same 
recommendation to find whether these characteristics consciously or unconsciously 
impact analysts’ recommendations. These characteristics are investigated with a 
regression analysis that consists of certain stock- and firm-specific figures and ratios. 
The basic regression model is constructed on the basis of Peltoniemi (2012).  
 
 
7.1. Portfolio construction 
 
In this study, the impact of analyst recommendations on stock returns is measured by 
long-term stock returns. On the basis of analysts’ consensus recommendations, three 
distinct portfolios are constructed. The first portfolio “Buy” includes stocks, which have 
achieved a Strong Buy or Buy recommendation by receiving a consensus 
recommendation of . The second portfolio includes stocks, which have received 
a Hold recommendation and a consensus recommendation equivalent to . The 
third portfolio holds stocks that have received a recommendation of Sell or Strong Sell 
with a consensus recommendation that is .  See Barber et al. (2001). 
 
The consensus recommendations are available only on a monthly basis and thus a stock 
is added or kept in, or removed from the portfolio in the beginning of each month. 
Portfolios are brought up to date monthly if necessary, and the number of transactions 
are calculated for each month for every portfolio. The transaction costs are calculated 
on the basis of transactions made per portfolio. This study uses Nordea’s quoted 
transaction costs in the beginning of 2015 for trades over 2500€, that is, 0,06% per trade. 
The consensus recommendation is illustrated mathematically below in equation 9. 
 
(9)   
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Where  is the average of recommendations for a stock i at time t,  is the number 
of recommendations for stock i at time t and  is an individual recommendation for 
stock i at time t. 
 
The returns of the portfolios are calculated monthly on the basis of the monthly 
cumulative returns of the stocks that are in each portfolio. Equation 10 below presents 
how the monthly return of a portfolio is calculated mathematically. 
 
(10)   
 
Where  is the monthly return of portfolio p,  is the monthly t return of a stock i 
and n is the number of stocks in the portfolio. 
 
The returns of each portfolio (Buy, Hold and Sell) are benchmarked to the returns of the 
markets (OMXH and OMXH24). Thus, the return of the market  is subtracted from 
the return of each portfolio . This gives out the abnormal return. This is 
demonstrated in equation 11. 
 
(11)  
 
The statistical significance of the returns is examined with Jensen’s alpha and market-
model derived from CAPM. The returns of the portfolios and the returns of the market 
are then placed in the market-model regression after subtracting the risk-free interest 
rate (in this study, 1-month Euribor) from the returns of portfolios and return of the 
market that is. The significance of the results is examined by the p-values and t-statistics. 
Where the t-value of 2 implies significance at the level of 5%. The regression model is 
presented in equation 12. 
 
(12)  
 
Where  is the return of the portfolio,  is the risk-free rate that in this study is the 
1-month Euribor,  is the intercept and illustrates the abnormal return,  is the beta of 
the portfolio and  is the return of the market. 
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7.2. Characteristics of stocks with the same consensus recommendation 
 
In the second part of the empirical research, stock-specific characteristics are examined 
with regression analysis. More specifically, this examination aims to determine, whether 
stocks with the same consensus recommendation share some characteristics and what 
these characteristics are. In addition the outlying interest is that do these characteristics 
consciously or unconsciously impact the analysts’ recommendations. A basic model is 
applied on the basis of Peltoniemi (2012) and then 3 more models are applied by adding 
important factors to the regression model. 
  
Examination is carried out with the data gathered from 1999-2014. The dependent 
variable in the regression is the abnormal return . The independent variables that 
are in the basic model that is presented in equation 13 are stock specific return on 
invested capital (ROIC), liquidity of each stock (LIQ), logarithm of market 
capitalization of each stock (LOGMCAP) and P/B ratio (PTB). This original regression 
is constructed on the basis of Peltoniemi (2012) because it has gathered the most basic 
stock-specific characteristics. In this thesis the model is extrapolated and examined with 
additional variables. The other regression models are constructed on the basis of the 
basic model by adding one other variable to each model to examine is there other stock 
specific characteristics that may increase the explanation for the abnormal returns. 
 
(13)  
 
Where  is the return of invested capital of firm i,  is the firm’s cash and 
equivalents divided by the total amount of the firm i’s current assets,  is the 
natural logarithm of the market value of firm i and  is the market value of the firm 
divided by the book value of the firm.  
 
ROIC describes the performance of the firm i and implicates how well a company 
generates cash flow in relation to invested capital. LIQ illustrates the financial distress 
of a company, thus if the figure diminishes or is small firm i experiences a shortfall in 
cash. Also the stock market capitalization was chosen to the regression in order to 
measure if the size of the company has an impact on the abnormal returns, and to find 
out whether the analysts prefer to pick large or very large companies. 
 
The LOGMCAP describes the market capitalization of the stock and aims to identify, 
does the size of the company impact the abnormal returns in terms of information 
ARpt
ARpt = β0 +β1ROICi +β2LIQi +β3LOGMCAPi +β4PTBi +εit
ROICi LIQi
LOGMCAPi
PTBi
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asymmetry and market liquidity. The P/B ratio describes the ratio between the stock’s 
market price and its book value. On the basis of this, stocks are divided into growth 
stocks and value stocks. Growth stocks usually have a high P/B-ratio (over 1) because 
they are expected to experience large growth in the future. Value stocks are expected to 
pay dividends evenly and are expected to create moderate but certain value through 
profit. Value stocks usually have lower P/B ratio (under 1) than growth stocks. This 
coefficient indicates what kind of recommendations analysts prefer to issue for value 
and growth stocks. 
 
(14)   
  
 
Equation 14 illustrates the regression model with GFCDUMMY. Where 
 is added in order to investigate the regression with the data that is 
considered as the post financial crisis period. The dummy achieves the value of 0 1999-
2008 and a value of 1 from 2009 to 2014. 
 
(15)   
  
 
Equation 15 represents the regression model where  is added to find out 
whether there is an impact also on the analysts’ accuracy on the recommended stocks. 
The accuracy is calculated by subtracting the analysts’ 12-month forecasted price at 
time t from the actual stock price at time t+12-months and then dividing the value by 
the actual share price at time t+12 months. Thus the absolute value of the figures is used 
in the regression. This regression is applied in order to investigate do the analysts’ 
accuracy have impact on the abnormal returns and do they for example issue similar 
recommendations on some stocks on the basis of their past accuracy. This variable was 
added on the basis of Clement and Senyo Y. Tse (2005) findings that analysts past 
accuracy impacts their recommendations. 
 
(16)  
  
 
Above is the equation 16, where  the natural logarithm of the trading 
volume of the stock is added to the basic regression model in order to research whether 
the trading volume impacts the abnormal returns of the portfolios. This variable is based 
ARpt = β0 +β1ROICi +β2LIQi +β3LOGMCAPi +β4PTBi
+β5GFCDUMMYi +εit
GFCDUMMYi
ARpt = β0 +β1ROICi +β2LIQi +β3LOGMCAPi +β4PTBi
+β5ACCURACYi +εit
ACCURACYi
ARpt = β0 +β1ROICi +β2LIQi +β3LOGMCAPi +β4PTBi
+β5LOGTURNOVERi +εit
LOGTURNOVERi
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on Barber & Loeffler’s (1993) and Barber et al. (2001) findings, which indicate that the 
impact is only perceived on stocks with the highest trading volumes. Turnover 
(LOGTURNOVER) measures how traded the stock is on the market and indicates the 
trading volume of a stock. Thus, it gives information about what kinds of 
recommendations analysts issue in terms of stock liquidity, in this case, whether they 
prefer stocks with high or medium liquidity. All of the coefficients are calculated on 
monthly basis. 
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8. RESULTS 
 
 
This part deals with the empirical part of the thesis. There are two hypotheses 
constructed, which are tested and analysed statistically and empirically in this part. The 
first hypothesis examines that are the analyst recommendations beneficial in order to 
achieve statistically significant abnormal returns on the stock market before and after 
transaction costs by following the recommendations of the largest stocks in the Finnish 
stock market. This phenomenon is measured by the performance of three distinct 
portfolios. Thus, if the constructed portfolios generate statistically significant abnormal 
returns, it can be concluded that analyst recommendations include new information that 
the stock prices has not yet captured. Thus, it is possible to employ investment strategy 
in order to follow new information of the analysts in order to achieve abnormal returns. 
Results indicate whether it is possible to generate positive or negative abnormal returns 
by following analyst recommendations and to find out are the results statistically 
significant. 
 
H1: By following analysts’ recommendations it is not possible to achieve statistically 
significant abnormal returns. 
 
The second hypothesis deals with stock characteristics and examines do the stocks with 
the same recommendation share some specific characteristics. In addition do these stock 
specific characteristics consciously or unconsciously impact the analysts’ 
recommendations. Four distinct models are constructed in order to examine these 
impacts. The variables (characteristics) are aggregated in regression as monthly average 
of each portfolio. These averages are then used as explanatory variables in the 
regression in order to explain the abnormal returns of these portfolios. Thus, if one or 
more of these coefficients are statistically significant it can be deduced that this or these 
characteristics impact consciously or unconsciously on the construction process of 
analysts’ recommendations. Then certain kind of stock returns can be expected on the 
basis of these characteristics. 
 
H2: Stocks with the same consensus recommendation do not have similar stock specific 
characteristics with each other. 
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8.1. The portfolios are constructed on the basis of the analysts’ consensus 
recommendations 
 
This part presents the construction of the portfolios and their performance. The 
descriptive statistics of the portfolios are presented in table 2. 
 
As mentioned in the limitations section, it is notable when comparing the portfolios 
with each other that portfolios with Buy recommendation have approximately 8 times 
fewer stocks on monthly average compared to hold-portfolios. The Buy portfolio 
remains the smallest for the whole period with the largest portfolio containing 6 stocks 
in September 2004 and on average they are 2 times smaller than Sell portfolio. The 
Largest Sell portfolio contained 13 stocks in March 2014 and the largest hold-portfolio 
contained 22 stocks in May 2008. The Hold portfolio is the largest every month during 
the sample period. Another significant observation is that there are no stocks in Buy and 
Sell portfolios during certain months. There are a total of 46 months without Buy 
recommendations and a total of 9 months without Sell recommendations in the sample. 
For example in 2013 there are not a single stock in omxh24 with buy recommendation. 
Table 2 represents the annual average of monthly consensus recommendations and the 
total annual recommendations outstanding for each portfolio.  
 
The stock market cycles should also be taken into account when examining the given 
data set of the analysts’ recommendations. In 2001-2002 the dotcom bubble caused a 
stock crash. As illustrated by table 2 the number of buy recommendations decrease 
from 2001 to 2003 from 38 to 15. At the same time the number of Sell 
recommendations increase from 14 to 40. Hold portfolio remains almost unchanged.  
Table 2. The annual average of monthly consensus recommendations and the total 
annual recommendations outstanding for each portfolio 
 
Year Buy(annual(nro(of(
recomm
Buy(average(of(
monthly(recomm
Hold(annual(nro(
of(recomm
Hold(average(of(
monthly(recomm
Sell(annual(nro(of(
recomm
Sell(average(of(
monthly(recomm
Total
1999 25 2,08 169 14,08 21 1,75 215
2000 37 3,08 161 13,42 23 1,92 221
2001 38 3,17 176 14,67 14 1,17 228
2002 26 2,17 184 15,33 18 1,50 228
2003 15 1,25 174 14,50 40 3,33 229
2004 35 2,92 186 15,50 24 2,00 245
2005 22 1,83 203 16,92 41 3,42 266
2006 46 3,83 196 16,33 36 3,00 278
2007 25 2,08 209 17,42 54 4,50 288
2008 32 2,67 235 19,58 21 1,75 288
2009 9 0,75 193 16,08 86 7,17 288
2010 10 0,83 213 17,75 65 5,42 288
2011 33 2,75 201 16,75 54 4,50 288
2012 7 0,58 217 18,08 64 5,33 288
2013 0 0,00 189 15,75 99 8,25 288
2014 14 1,17 167 13,92 107 8,92 288
Total 374 1,95 3073 16,01 767 3,99 4214
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The second significant phenomenon on the market was the global financial crisis. It was 
triggered by subprime loans in the United States that caused stock market crash in 2008-
2009. In 2009 there were only approximately 0,75 Buy recommendations in each month 
and 9 for the whole year. The monthly average for Sell recommendations was 7,17 and 
there were 86 Sell recommendations outstanding. Also, Hold recommendations were 
the highest in 2008 for the whole sample period 1999-2014. On monthly average there 
were 19,58 stocks in the Hold portfolio and the total outstanding recommendations in 
2008 were 235. This might indicate that also analysts foreshadow the financial crisis. 
The Buy recommendations were the highest in 2006 prior the global financial crisis 
with a total of 46 Buy recommendations outstanding. 
 
However, the most interesting period is the European debt crisis during 2011-2013, 
which seems to have had a large impact to the year 2013. During that year there were 
zero stocks with Buy recommendation. However, there were a total of 99 stocks with 
Sell recommendation and 8,25 stocks on monthly average in Sell portfolio. Overall 
there was the smallest number of recommendations in 1999 with a total number of 215 
and the largest amount of recommendation each year after 2007 totalling an amunt of 
288. 
 
Table 3 illustrates the standard deviation of the size of the portfolios in terms of 
recommendations. The standard deviation of the Hold portfolio is the largest with STD 
of 1,42, meaning that it experienced the largest changes in size compared to the other 2 
portfolios. However the standard deviation of the Hold portfolio is only 0,37 stocks 
higher than buy-portfolio’s and 0,14 stocks higher than Sell portfolio’s. Thus, none of 
the portfolios experienced significantly higher volatility compared with each other. Buy 
portfolio experienced the largest STD of 2,1 in 2004 Hold portfolio in 2007 with STD 
of 1,98 and Sell portfolio in 2014 with STD of 2,43. The period after the European debt 
crisis might explain the large STD of the Sell portfolio in 2014. 
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Table 3. Annual standard deviation of the number of stocks in each portfolio 
 
Table 4 below illustrates the annual returns of the constructed portfolios and the 
markets OMXH and OMXH24. OMXH24 is formed from all of the stocks under 
examination in this study. The list of the picked stocks was represented in the data part 
of this study. 
 
 
Table 4. Annual market and portfolio returns 
 
 
Year Buy(annual(std(of(
the(recomm
Hold(annual(std(of(
the(recomm
Sell(annual(std(of(
the(recomm
1999 1,38 1,61 0,92
2000 1,11 1,32 0,95
2001 0,69 1,37 0,80
2002 0,99 1,11 0,65
2003 0,92 0,96 1,31
2004 2,10 1,12 1,96
2005 1,21 1,80 1,71
2006 1,46 1,89 1,15
2007 0,64 1,98 1,89
2008 1,37 1,61 1,09
2009 0,60 1,66 1,46
2010 0,99 1,09 0,95
2011 1,30 1,23 1,04
2012 0,95 1,38 1,37
2013 0,00 0,83 0,83
2014 1,07 1,80 2,43
Average 1,05 1,42 1,28
Year Buy(monthly(
average
Hold(monthly(
average
Sell(monthly(
average
OMXH OMXH24
1999 64,63% 37,38% 27,59% 106,16% 43,74%
2000 B6,94% B8,82% 0,01% B9,13% B2,32%
2001 16,43% 10,35% B24,86% B23,10% 8,47%
2002 20,78% B13,80% B5,50% B35,92% B11,34%
2003 53,77% 22,58% 27,09% 7,10% 24,84%
2004 35,54% 23,10% 17,60% 6,07% 24,39%
2005 46,06% 33,03% 17,70% 28,15% 31,75%
2006 30,70% 30,17% 39,54% 17,31% 32,04%
2007 B1,97% 8,02% B31,32% 19,46% 1,50%
2008 B93,27% B67,22% B81,23% B71,57% B67,89%
2009 18,18% 54,80% 60,09% 22,12% 56,76%
2010 11,23% 39,54% 18,78% 18,96% 33,68%
2011 B35,68% B25,62% B18,51% B33,97% B26,72%
2012 25,55% 17,41% 18,55% 9,64% 18,38%
2013 0,00% 24,90% 3,32% 24,43% 17,29%
2014 B5,00% B2,21% 4,95% 6,11% 2,16%
Total 179,99% 183,60% 73,83% 91,82% 186,73%
Annual(average 11,25% 11,47% 4,61% 5,74% 11,67%
monthly(average 1,23% 0,96% 0,40% 0,48% 0,97%
Std 36,43% 28,99% 31,87% 37,13% 29,06%
returnBtoBrisk 4,94 6,33 2,32 2,47 6,43
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It is notable that the highest and the lowest returns of each portfolio came from either 
during the dotcom bubble or during the GFC. Also in 2008 during the GFC the buy 
portfolio had the worst success by yielding the highest negative return during that time. 
All portfolios and the markets yielded a negative return in 2008 and also in 2011 during 
the European debt crisis. 
 
Even though the hold-portfolio yielded the highest cumulative and average returns 
during the sample period it did not offer the highest returns every year. Buy portfolio 
offered the highest annual returns in 1999, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2012. 
However the Sell portfolio offered the highest annual returns of the portfolios in 2000, 
2006, 2009, 2011 and 2014. Also, none of the portfolios won the market in 1999 and 
2007. It is quite interesting because both of those periods are a year prior to dotcom and 
subprime crisis. This might indicate that analysts tend to loose creditability on the edge 
of crisis periods. 
 
In addition in 2014 buy-portfolio offered the worst return with -5%, hold-portfolio -
2,21% and surprisingly the Sell portfolio yielded a return of 4,95%. This might indicate 
of huge undervaluation of stocks that had received a Sell recommendation during 
European financial crisis and in 2014 they increased to their fundamental value. It might 
also be so that analysts can’t forecast the right stocks to buy and Sell. The figure 7 
represents the annual returns graphically. 
 
Buy portfolio has the highest standard deviation of 38,20% and the market has just a 
little less 36,43%. Hold portfolio has the lowest standard deviation 28,99% of the 
portfolios, however, OMXH24 has 29,06%. The OMXH24 index offered the highest 
return in terms of risk level and achieved the highest return-to-risk ratio 6,43 (total 
cumulative return/standard deviation). However, the Hold portfolio offered the second 
Figure 7. Annual market and portfolio returns 
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highest return-to-risk ratio of 6,33 that was also the highest out of the three portfolios. 
Surprisingly, the OMXH offered the second lowest return-to-risk ratio 2,47 making it 
the least attractive investment.  Finally, the Sell portfolio had a return-to-risk ratio of 
only 2,32 and a total 15-year return of 73,83% making it the only portfolio that did not 
outperform the OMXH. Table 5 illustrates the returns of each portfolio and key ratios 
after adjusting for trading costs. 
 
In table 6 is presented the difference between each portfolio and two market 
benchmarks OMXH and OMXH24, which are calculated on monthly basis. The buy-
portfolio has outperformed the OMXH during 8 years out of 15 and OMXH24 in 7 
years. However the hold-portfolio outperformed the market OMXH24 during 7 years 
and OMXH during 13 years. Sell portfolio outperformed OMXH and OMXH24 during 
8 years. We find that buy –and hold-portfolios did beat the OMXH index, however 
when benchmarked with OMXH24 the results change and only none of the portfolios 
outperformed the OMXH24-index. Hold –and Sell portfolios yielded their highest 
annual abnormal returns in 2001 and buy-portfolio in 2002 when benchmarked with 
OMXH. The post Tech bubble period would explain why the highest abnormal returns 
are concentrated in 2001-2002. However when benchmarked with OMXH24 the buy-
portfolio yields the highest return also in 2002, hold-portfolio in 2013 and Sell portfolio 
in 2011. On average the hold-portfolio had the highest absolute average return monthly 
Table 5. Portfolio returns post trading costs 
 
Year Buy(tc+monthly+
average
Hold(tc+monthly+
average
Sell(tc+monthly+
average
OMXH OMXH24
1999 63,85% 35,64% 27,29% 106,16% 43,74%
2000 (7,36% (9,84% (0,47% (9,13% (2,32%
2001 16,19% 9,69% (25,34% (23,10% 8,47%
2002 20,30% (14,76% (5,98% (35,92% (11,34%
2003 53,29% 21,68% 26,55% 7,10% 24,84%
2004 34,82% 21,72% 16,88% 6,07% 24,39%
2005 45,40% 31,05% 16,38% 28,15% 31,75%
2006 29,80% 28,19% 38,40% 17,31% 32,04%
2007 (2,63% 5,92% (32,76% 19,46% 1,50%
2008 (94,11% (69,20% (82,31% (71,57% (67,89%
2009 17,94% 52,94% 58,47% 22,12% 56,76%
2010 10,87% 37,98% 17,58% 18,96% 33,68%
2011 (36,88% (27,48% (19,29% (33,97% (26,72%
2012 25,13% 15,91% 17,47% 9,64% 18,38%
2013 0,00% 23,58% 2,06% 24,43% 17,29%
2014 (5,42% (3,83% 3,69% 6,11% 2,16%
Total 171,17% 159,18% 58,65% 91,82% 186,73%
Annual+average 10,70% 9,95% 3,67% 5,74% 11,67%
monthly+average 0,89% 0,83% 0,31% 0,48% 0,97%
Std 36,49% 28,99% 31,83% 37,13% 29,06%
return(to(risk 4,69 5,49 1,84 2,47 6,43
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and annually out of the three portfolios. All of the portfolios performed poorly and 
yielded a negative return from the 15-year period when benchmarked with omxh24. 
 
 
Table 7 Illustrates the abnormal returns of the portfolios after subtracting transaction 
costs from the portfolios returns and then the market returns were subtracted.  
Transaction costs are determined by first calculating the total monthly trades executed 
Table 6. Annual abnormal returns of the portfolios   
 
Table 7. Annual abnormal returns of portfolios when transaction costs taken into 
consideration 
 
Year Buy(omxh Hold(omxh Sell(omxh Buy(omxh24 Hold(omxh24 Sell(omxh24
1999 (41,53% (68,78% (78,57% 20,88% (6,37% (16,16%
2000 2,19% 0,31% 9,14% (4,62% (6,50% 2,33%
2001 39,53% 33,45% (1,75% 7,96% 1,87% (33,33%
2002 56,70% 22,12% 30,42% 32,12% (2,46% 5,84%
2003 46,67% 15,48% 19,99% 28,93% (2,25% 2,26%
2004 29,47% 17,02% 11,53% 11,15% (1,29% (6,79%
2005 17,91% 4,88% (10,45% 14,31% 1,28% (14,05%
2006 13,39% 12,86% 22,23% (1,34% (1,87% 7,50%
2007 (21,43% (11,44% (50,77% (3,48% 6,52% (32,82%
2008 (21,70% 4,35% (9,65% (25,38% 0,67% (13,33%
2009 (3,94% 32,68% 37,97% (38,59% (1,96% 3,33%
2010 (7,72% 20,58% (0,17% (22,45% 5,86% (14,89%
2011 (1,71% 8,35% 15,46% (8,96% 1,10% 8,21%
2012 15,91% 7,77% 8,91% 7,17% (0,97% 0,17%
2013 (24,43% 0,46% (21,11% (17,29% 7,61% (13,96%
2014 (11,11% (8,32% (1,16% (7,16% (4,37% 2,79%
Total 88,17% 91,78% (17,99% (6,73% (3,13% (112,90%
AnnualAaverage 5,51% 5,74% (1,12% (0,42% (0,20% (7,06%
monthlyAaverage 0,46% 0,48% (0,09% (0,04% (0,02% (0,59%
Std 26,87% 22,87% 28,70% 19,12% 4,06% 12,94%
return(to(risk 3,28 4,01 (0,63 (0,35 (0,77 (8,73
Year Buy(tc(omxh Hold(tc(omxh Sell(tc(omxh Buy(tc(omxh24 Hold(tc(omxh24 Sell(tc(omxh24
1999 (42,31% (70,52% (78,87% 20,10% (8,11% (16,46%
2000 1,77% (0,71% 8,66% (5,04% (7,52% 1,85%
2001 39,29% 32,79% (2,23% 7,72% 1,21% (33,81%
2002 56,22% 21,16% 29,94% 31,64% (3,42% 5,36%
2003 46,19% 14,58% 19,45% 28,45% (3,15% 1,72%
2004 28,75% 15,64% 10,81% 10,43% (2,67% (7,51%
2005 17,25% 2,90% (11,77% 13,65% (0,70% (15,37%
2006 12,49% 10,88% 21,09% (2,24% (3,85% 6,36%
2007 (22,09% (13,54% (52,21% (4,14% 4,42% (34,26%
2008 (22,54% 2,37% (10,73% (26,22% (1,31% (14,41%
2009 (4,18% 30,82% 36,35% (38,83% (3,82% 1,71%
2010 (8,08% 19,02% (1,37% (22,81% 4,30% (16,09%
2011 (2,91% 6,49% 14,68% (10,16% (0,76% 7,43%
2012 15,49% 6,27% 7,83% 6,75% (2,47% (0,91%
2013 (24,43% (0,86% (22,37% (17,29% 6,29% (15,22%
2014 (11,53% (9,94% (2,42% (7,58% (5,99% 1,53%
Total 79,35% 67,36% (33,17% (15,55% (27,55% (128,08%
AnnualBaverage 4,96% 4,21% (2,07% (0,97% (1,72% (8,00%
MonthlyBaverage 0,41% 0,35% (0,17% (0,08% (0,14% (0,67%
Std 26,90% 23,02% 28,67% 19,08% 4,01% 12,97%
Return(to(risk 2,95 2,93 (1,16 (0,82 (6,88 (9,88
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by each portfolio. Then I have used Nordea’s trading costs for over 2500€ trades in the 
Nordics that were 0,06% for one trade. Thus, after calculating the monthly trades the 
trading costs are multiplied by the number of trades executed in that month and 
subtracted from the monthly portfolio returns.  
 
The long-short portfolio was built based by allocating stocks with buy recommendation 
to be bought and stocks with Sell recommendation to be short sold. This means that if 
stocks with buy recommendation has a positive return the portfolio returns would 
increase and if Sell side has a negative return it also increases the overall portfolio 
return because I have shorted the stocks. This study does not take dividends, short-
interest rebate nor other costs associated with short Selling into account. Only 
transaction costs are examined. 
 
The below table 8 shows that by holding stocks with buy recommendation and short 
Selling stocks with sel recommendation does not yield a higher return compared to buy 
and hold portfolios. However the long-short portfolio does exceed the returns of the Sell 
portfolio. It is also notable that the total transaction costs for the period stand at 24% 
that is high relative to other portfolios. The hedge portfolio also performs the best 
during the dotcom bubble in 1999-2001. On the other hand the performance is very poor 
during the GFC in 2009-2011. 
 
Table 8. Hedge portfolio, long on Buy - short on Sell 
 
 
 
Year Long	on	Buy,	
short	on	Sell
Long	on	Buy,	
short	on	Sell	-	tc
1999 41,54% 40,46%
2000 -1,47% -2,37%
2001 24,73% 24,01%
2002 18,68% 17,72%
2003 -14,02% -15,04%
2004 19,51% 18,07%
2005 14,47% 12,49%
2006 0,78% -1,26%
2007 17,48% 15,38%
2008 15,76% 13,84%
2009 -54,02% -55,88%
2010 -14,70% -16,26%
2011 -7,77% -9,75%
2012 -7,07% -8,57%
2013 -3,32% -4,58%
2014 -7,22% -8,90%
Total 43,36% 19,36%
Annual	average 2,71% 1,21%
Monthly	average 0,23% 0,10%
Std 21,24% 40,46%
Return-to-risk 2,04 0,48
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Table 9 demonstrates the total annual trading costs experienced by each portfolio in 
order to follow recommendations. Buy-portfolio experienced the highest trading costs 
in 2011 with 1,20% while annual average being 0,55% and monthly average 0,05%. 
Hold portfolio experienced its top trading costs in 2007 being 2,10%, having an annual 
and monthly average of 1,53% and 0,13% respectively. Sell portfolio had the highest 
trading costs 1,62% in 2009 with annual average of 0,95% and monthly average of 
0,10%. Global financial crisis would explain the high recommendation changes in 2009 
thus causing large trading costs for Sell portfolio. I find the trading costs to remain at a 
low level, however, the Nordea’s quoted trading prices might bias the trading costs 
because those costs were pobably much higher prior to the GFC. 
 
Table 9. Total annual trading cost of each portfolio 
 
8.1.1. Regression analysis 
 
The first empirical part identifies whether the abnormal returns of the portfolios are 
statistically significant or not. After the portfolio returns are cleared out, it is 
investigated are the portfolio returns random or is there a pattern how the returns are 
achieved. The portfolio returns are then regressed by using the market-model in order 
to investigate the statistical significance of the Jensen’s alphas. The statistical 
significance is measured on 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. The regression results 
are presented in tables 10 and 11. In table 10 OMXH and in table 11 OMXH24 is used 
as benchmark. 
 
 Year Buy Hold Sell Long-Short
1999 0,78% 1,74% 0,30% 1,08%
2000 0,42% 1,02% 0,48% 0,90%
2001 0,24% 0,66% 0,48% 0,72%
2002 0,48% 0,96% 0,48% 0,96%
2003 0,48% 0,90% 0,54% 1,02%
2004 0,72% 1,38% 0,72% 1,44%
2005 0,66% 1,98% 1,32% 1,98%
2006 0,90% 1,98% 1,14% 2,04%
2007 0,66% 2,10% 1,44% 2,10%
2008 0,84% 1,98% 1,08% 1,92%
2009 0,24% 1,86% 1,62% 1,86%
2010 0,36% 1,56% 1,20% 1,56%
2011 1,20% 1,86% 0,78% 1,98%
2012 0,42% 1,50% 1,08% 1,50%
2013 0,00% 1,32% 1,26% 1,26%
2014 0,42% 1,62% 1,26% 1,68%
Total 8,82% 24,42% 15,18% 24,00%
Annual	average 0,55% 1,53% 0,95% 1,50%
monthly	average 0,05% 0,13% 0,10% 0,12%
Std 0,29% 0,43% 0,39% 0,45%
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What is notable from the results when regressed on OMXH is that the alphas are all 
significant on 1%-level. Thus, implicating the results to be highly statistically 
significant. Thus meaning that the hypothesis (i) is rejected on the basis of all three 
portfolios when examining the alphas prior to subtracting trading costs. The intercept of 
Buy portfolio is 0,4655 and achieving an R-squared of 0,324. I find the results 
convincing on the part of Buy portfolio. The results on Hold portfolio are similar to Buy 
portfolio. The alpha is 0,402 and R-squared 0,578 implicating even stronger results than 
Buy portfolio. However Sell portfolio has the alpha of 0,596 and R-squared of 0,177. 
Low R-squared compared to others implicate that the model does not explain the returns 
that well. Durbin-Watson statistics implicate low autocorrelation levels by achieving 
values ranging from 1,52 to 1,79. 
 
When the portfolios are regressed on OMXH24 only the Buy portfolio now remains 
significant on 1%-level with alpha of 0,166 and an increased R-squared of 0,469 
compared to the previous results. The Hold and Sell portfolios are not statistically 
significant, however the R-squared of hold-portfolio has increased from 0,578 to 0,965 
and Sell portfolio from 0,177 to 0,571. Meaning that the model now explains the alphas 
Table 10. Portfolios regressed on OMXH 
 
Table 11. Portfolios regressed on OMXH24 
 
Market'model Intercept OMXH R2 D'W
Buy 0,465*** 0,531*** 0,324 1,644
t'statistic 8,472 9,537
Hold 0,402*** 0,595*** 0,578 1,520
t'statistic 11,053 16,134
Sell 0,596*** 0,392*** 0,177 1,790
t'statistic 9,881 6,402
SignificanceJlevelJat *10% **5% ***1%
Market'model Intercept OMXH24 R2 D'W
Buy 0,166*** 0,831*** 0,469 1,786
t'statistic 2,617 12,983
Hold 0,000 1,000*** 0,965 1,954
t'statistic '0,029 72,384
Sell 0,079 0,914*** 0,571 2,050
t'statistic 1,390 15,897
SignificanceJlevelJat *10% **5% ***1%
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very well. Durbin-Watson statistics has also increased close to 2 indicating low 
autocorrelation levels. 
 
Tables 12 and 13 illustrate the market-model regression results after subtracting 
transaction costs from monthly returns. As described by the tables, the results remain 
exactly the same. Thus, the hypothesis (i) is rejected even after trading costs. Results 
give a strong indication of the fact that it is possible to beat the market and achieve 
statistically significant abnormal returns by following the recommendations of large 
stocks. 
 
 
 
8.2. Stock characteristics of stocks within the same recommendation group, 
which may consciously or unconsciously impact analysts’ 
recommendations 
 
The second empirical part tries to assess whether the stocks with the same 
recommendation share some stock specific characteristics. Which is also the second 
hypothesis of this study H:2. This analysis is based on the fact that analysts’ issue 
Table 12. Portfolios regressed on OMXH after transaction costs 
 
Table 13. Portfolios regressed on OMXH24 after transaction costs 
 
Market'model Intercept OMXH R2 D'W
Buy 0,464*** 0,532*** 0,324 1,650
t'statistic 8,472 9,547
Hold 0,401*** 0,595*** 0,577 1,521
t'statistic 11,017 16,101
Sell 0,596*** 0,392*** 0,177 1,794
t'statistic 9,871 6,392
SignificanceJlevelJat *10% **5% ***1%
Market'model Intercept OMXH24 R2 D'W
Buy 0,165** 0,832*** 0,470 1,788
t'statistic 2,599 12,983
Hold '0,002 '0,125 0,965 1,960
t'statistic '0,125 72,311
Sell 0,079 0,913*** 0,570 2,051
t'statistic 1,390 15,856
SignificanceJlevelJat *10% **5% ***1%
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consciously or unconsciously similar recommendations for the stocks with the same 
kind of stock specific characteristics. Hence, these stock specific characteristics may 
hold information, which explain the abnormal returns generated by the portfolios. In 
addition, these characteristics may be applied in forecasting the performance of stocks 
with specific characteristics. Portfolios average key ratios are presented in table 14. 
 
Table 15 presents the results of the paired two sample of means t-test. 83% of the key-
ratio differences between portfolios are highly significant indicating strong support on 
behalf of the coefficients. PTB (price-to-book) coefficient has the weakest significance 
between the portfolios, whereas turnover has the highest. 
 
8.2.1. Regression analysis 
 
There are some irregularities within the coefficients due to the fact that there are some 
specific months when there are no stocks in Buy and Sell portfolios. There are 46 
months without stocks in Buy portfolio and 9 months without stocks in Sell portfolio 
during 1999-2014. However, these irregularities are not constant expect during year 
2013 in the case of Buy portfolio and thus do not significantly impact the results. 
Table 14. Portfolios’ average key ratios of the coefficients 1999-2014 
 
Table 15. T-test results of paired two sample for means for the differences between the 
portfolios’ (Buy, Hold and Sell) key ratios 
 
Coefficients Buy Hold Sell
ROIC 14,440 11,959 11,294
LIQ 15,859 18,612 19,056
LOGMCAP 3,660 3,828 3,392
PTB 3,083 2,219 2,149
GFCdummy 2009G2014 2009G2014 2009G2014
ACCURACY 0,363 0,405 0,404
LOGTURNOVER 4,316 4,594 4,150
Coefficient Buy,hold Buy,sell Hold,sell
ACCURACY ,7,082*** ,3,951*** 0,718
LIQ ,6,536*** ,5,308*** 1,759**
LOGMCAP ,10,508*** ,7,028*** 4,017***
ROIC ,2,065** 0,317 2,611***
PTB 0,526 1,306* 2,643***
LOGTURNOVER ,9,561*** ,4,23*** 7,977***
SignificancePlevelPat *10% **5% ***1%
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The averages of the coefficients in table 14 were calculated for the portfolios each 
month. ROIC is the return on invested capital, LIQ that is the cash and cash equivalents 
divided by current assets, LOGMCAP is the natural logarithm of the market 
capitalization, PTB that is the market price of the stock divided by the book-value of the 
stock, GFCDUMMY measures if there is an impact of the financial cycle on the 
coefficients and GFCDUMMY receives a value of 0 1999-2008 and a value of 1 in 
2009-2014, ACCURACY is the actual share price at time t+12 months divided by 
analyst forecast at time t divided by the actual share price at time t+12 months, thus the 
coefficient is lagged by 12 month in order to examine whether the accuracy of the 
forecast impacted in the past and finally the natural logarithm of the turnover that is the 
trading volume of the stock on the market.  It is notable from the table that all of the 
coefficients are quite close to each other, especially the logarithm of market 
capitalization, accuracy and turnover. Buy portfolio has the largest ROIC and PTB. 
However, Sell portfolio has the highest LIQ on average. 
 
The table 16 illustrates the regression results of the 4 different models when the 
portfolio abnormal returns are regressed on OMXH. Results in table 16 suggest poor 
statistical significance. Only the Sell portfolio achieved a price-to-book ratio on 10% 
statistical significance level when ACCURACY was added to the basic model. The -
0,015 coefficient implicates that an increase in price-to-book ratio has a negative impact 
on the abnormal returns of the stocks, which have received a recommendation of Sell. 
The Sell portfolio had the lowest average of price-to-book ratio out of the three 
portfolios during the period of 1999-2014. Also, the R-squared is the highest in the 
model with ACCURACY. The Buy portfolio achieved the highest R-squared of 0,111. 
Durbin-Watson is also the highest on average when ACCURACY is added to the model. 
Durbin-Watson varies between 1,462 and 2,135 across models and portfolios. 
 
Table 17 illustrates the results after adjusting portfolio returns with OMXH24. The 
results change when adjusting with OMXH24. However, the results of the Buy portfolio 
remain exactly the same. Only the intercept achieves a 10% significance level when 
ACCURACY is added to the model. The Hold portfolio, on the other hand, achieves 
completely different results. The intercepts are statistically significant on 5%-level in 
every model expect when ACCURACY is added. The logarithm of market 
capitalization is also statistically significant on 10%-level in every model expect when 
ACCURACY is added. The coefficient varies from 0,004 to 0,006, implicating that the 
size of the stocks that achieved a Hold recommendation has a positive impact on the 
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abnormal returns of these stocks. The Hold portfolio had the largest average market 
capitalization out of the three portfolios during 1999-2014. 
 
 
Table 16. Regression results of each model after adjusting portfolio returns with 
OMXH 
 
Table 17. Regression results of each model after adjusting portfolio returns with 
OMXH24 
 
Coefficients Buy-omxh Buy-omxh Buy-omxh Buy-omxh Hold-
omxh
Hold-
omxh
Hold-
omxh
Hold-
omxh
Sell-omxh Sell-omxh Sell-omxh Sell-omxh
Intercept 0,040 0,047 0,16** 0,108 -0,094 -0,102 0,303 -0,092 -0,033 -0,014 0,028 -0,034
t-statistic 0,882 1,001 2,331 1,402 -1,128 -1,151 1,795 -1,094 -0,601 -0,228 0,568 -0,568
ROIC 0,000 -0,001 -0,001 0,000 0,001 0,001 -0,001 0,001 0,000 0,000 0,001 0,001
t-statistic -0,079 -0,578 -0,424 0,113 0,619 0,657 -0,716 0,550 0,445 0,490 0,597 0,440
LIQ 0,000 0,000 0,001 0,000 0,000 0,000 -0,001 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,001 0,000
t-statistic -0,618 0,082 1,546 -0,359 0,156 -0,128 -0,713 0,168 0,170 -0,110 0,989 0,167
MCAP 0,002 -0,002 -0,013 0,004 0,015 0,016 -0,032 0,012 0,005 0,003 -0,001 0,005
t-statistic -0,397 -0,325 -1,599 0,441 1,336 1,320 -1,571 0,743 0,615 0,333 -0,192 0,499
PTB -0,001 -0,001 -0,013 -0,001 -0,023 -0,023 0,007 -0,022 -0,007 -0,008 -0,015* -0,007
t-statistic -0,344 -0,327 -0,853 -0,322 -1,655 -1,661 0,593 -1,538 -0,897 -0,934 -1,941 -0,849
GFCdummy -0,021 0,004 0,011
t-statistic -0,789 0,263 0,623
ACCURACY -0,016 -0,001 -0,015
t-statistic -0,771 -0,117 -1,499
LOGTURNOVER -0,013 0,002 0,000
t-statistic -1,092 0,289 0,015
RTsquared 0,002 0,021 0,111 0,025 0,022 0,023 0,049 0,023 0,006 0,009 0,064 0,006
Durbin-Watson 1,828 1,839 1,809 1,878 1,448 1,450 1,927 1,450 1,462 1,467 2,135 1,462
SignificanceTlevelTat *10% **5% ***1%
Coefficients Buy-
omxh24
Buy-
omxh24
Buy-
omxh24
Buy-
omxh24
Hold-
omxh24
Hold-
omxh24
Hold-
omxh24
Hold-
omxh24
Sell-
omxh24
Sell-
omxh24
Sell-
omxh24
Sell-
omxh24
Intercept 0,042 0,045 0,1* 0,061 -0,039** -0,043** -0,075 -0,041** -0,057* -0,065* -0,035 -0,050
t-statistic 1,228 1,285 1,802 1,039 -2,100 -2,190 -1,267 -2,169 -1,700 -1,688 -1,005 -1,406
ROIC 0,000 0,000 0,001 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
t-statistic 0,026 -0,280 0,351 0,094 0,625 0,737 0,957 0,780 0,059 0,027 -0,233 -0,031
LIQ 0,000 0,000 0,001 -0,001 0,000 0,000 0,001** 0,000 0,001 0,001 0,001 0,001
t-statistic -1,220 -0,584 1,065 -1,098 0,844 0,043 2,050 0,806 0,684 0,795 1,211 0,728
MCAP -0,005 -0,004 -0,008 -0,003 0,004 0,0049* 0,007 0,006* 0,007 0,008 0,004 0,008
t-statistic -1,006 -0,958 -1,205 -0,478 1,662* 1,772 1,009 1,789 1,318 1,370 0,914 1,391
PTB 0,003 0,003 -0,016 0,003 -0,002 -0,002 -0,002 -0,003 -0,005 -0,005 -0,006 -0,004
t-statistic 0,988 0,994 -1,277 0,992 -0,668 0,488 -0,529 -0,852 1,002 -0,970 -1,134 -0,766
GFCdummy -0,009 0,002 -0,005
t-statistic -0,457 0,633 -0,416
ACCURACY -0,012 -0,001 -0,010
t-statistic -0,736 -0,427 -1,431
LOGTURNOVER -0,003 -0,002 -0,002
t-statistic -0,391 -0,866 -0,539
RTsquared 0,036 0,038 0,078 0,037 0,032 0,034 0,043 0,036 0,020 0,021 0,058 0,022
Durbin-Watson 1,848 1,856 1.591 1,865 1,994 1,998 2,146 1,992 1,960 1,960 2,072 1,960
SignificanceTlevelTat *10% **5% ***1%
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It is interesting that when the ACCURACY coefficient is added to the basic model 
(table 17), the Hold portfolio has statistically significant LIQ on 5%-level. The 
coefficient is 0,001, implicating that the LIQUIDITY ratio has a positive impact on the 
returns of the stocks in the Hold portfolio. It is notable that in the case of each portfolio, 
the R-squared is the highest when ACCURACY is added to the basic model, achieving 
the highest R-squared of 0,078 in the Buy portfolio. The Durbin-Watson statistic 
reaches values from 1,591 to 2,146 across the portfolios, implicating a low level of 
autocorrelation in the regressions. Sell portfolios do not offer any statistically 
significant results. This might be due to the high negative abnormal returns. 
 
Overall, the results when adjusting with OMXH suggest that price-to-book ratio has a 
negative impact on the stocks, which have received a recommendation of Sell. This 
indicates that an increase in price-to-book ratio has a negative impact on returns of 
stocks in the Sell portfolio. This follows from the fact that value stocks are seen more 
favourable in terms of long-term returns than growth stocks. However, the results 
remain on 10%-statistical significance level. 
 
When adjusting with OMXH24 the results indicate that an increase in market 
capitalization of stocks in the Hold portfolio has a positive impact on the returns of 
those stocks. An increase in market value can be seen as a positive indicator of future 
growth, or at least investors expect growth. The results also remain on 10% statistical 
significance level. When ACCURACY is added to the model, the LIQ coefficient 
achieves the only statistical significance level of 5% in the Hold portfolio. The 
coefficient suggests that an increase in liquidity has a positive impact on stock returns in 
the Hold portfolio. However, the coefficient is quite small at 0,001, suggesting only a 
marginal impact. 
 
8.2.2. Transaction costs 
 
Tables 18 and 19 represent the regression results for each model after adjusting the 
portfolio returns with transaction costs. Results after adjusting with OMXH presented in 
table 18 seem interesting because now the price-to-book coefficient is statistically 
significant on 10%-level in the Hold portfolio’s basic model and when GFCDUMMY is 
added. In addition, the coefficient is statistically significant on 10%-level in the Sell 
portfolio when ACCURACY is added to the model. This corresponds to the results 
achieved also before trading costs in table 16. The coefficients received a value of -
0,023 in the basic model and when GFCDUMMY was added. This suggests that price-
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to-book ratio has a negative impact on the stock returns of the Hold portfolio. The Hold 
portfolio has the second-highest monthly average of price-to-book ratio, and the Sell 
portfolio the lowest monthly average. What is significant is that the results remain 
exactly the same when GFCDUMMY is added. This fact implicates that the periods of 
financial crisis, any other crisis, and stock cycles seem to have no impact on the results. 
Again, the portfolios with the ACCURACY coefficient achieve the highest R-squared, 
meaning that the data best fits this model when compared with the others. Durbin-
Watson varies from 1,449 to 2,129, implicating a low amount of autocorrelation. 
 
After adjusting with trading costs and OMXH24 in table 19, the results remain very 
close to table 18, prior to adjusting with trading costs. Only the Hold portfolio now 
holds some statistical significance on every model, and the coefficients also remain 
almost exactly the same. Market Capitalization achieves a 10% statistical significance 
level in three out of four models with the coefficient ranging from 0,005 to 0,007, a 
change of 0,0001 from the results without trading costs. The results are in line with the 
previous finding prior to trading costs. In addition, when ACCURACY is added to the 
model, it again achieves the highest R-squared in each portfolio, and now also the LIQ 
factor is statistically significant on 5%-level with a coefficient of 0,001. This again 
indicates that liquidity positively impacts the abnormal returns of the Hold portfolio 
stocks. 
Table 18. Regression results of each model after transaction costs and adjusting 
portfolio returns with OMXH 
 
Coefficients Buy-tc-
omxh
Buy-tc-
omxh
Buy-tc-
omxh
Buy-tc-
omxh
hold-tc-
omxh
hold-tc-
omxh
hold-tc-
omxh
Hold-tc-
omxh
Sell-tc-
omxh
Sell-tc-
omxh
Sell-tc-
omxh
Sell-tc-
omxh
intercept 0,040 0,047 0,159** 0,109 -0,097 -0,104 0,299*** -0,095 -0,033 -0,014 0,027 -0,033
t-statistic 0,878 1,004 2,333 1,418 -1,159 -1,178 1,775 -1,128 -0,591 -0,221 0,554 -0,557
ROIC 0,000 -0,001 -0,001 0,000 0,001 0,001 -0,001 0,001 0,000 0,001 0,001 0,001
t-statistic -0,086 -0,589 -0,412 0,110 0,586 0,624 -0,774 0,524 0,441 0,486 0,581 0,435
LIQ 0,000 0,000 0,001 0,000 0,000 0,000 -0,001 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,001 0,000
t-statistic -0,619 0,088 1,556 -0,355 0,113 -0,146 -0,727 0,124 0,173 -0,109 0,996 0,171
MCAP -0,002 -0,002 -0,013 0,004 0,015 0,017 -0,032 0,012 0,005 0,003 -0,001 0,005
t-statistic -0,405 -0,332 -1,605 0,450 1,364 1,343 -1,555 0,783 0,598 0,318 -0,198 0,488
PTB -0,001 -0,001 -0,014 -0,001 -0,023*** -0,023*** 0,007 -0,022 -0,007 -0,008 -0,015*** -0,007
t-statistic -0,333 -0,316 -0,873 -0,310 -1,653 -1,658 0,600 -1,542 -0,913 -0,950 -1,937 -0,863
GFCdummy -0,021 0,004 0,011
t-statistic -0,799 0,255 0,619
ACCURACY -0,016 -0,001 -0,015
t-statistic -0,781 -0,110 -1,483
LOGTURNOVER -0,013 0,002 0,000
t-statistic -1,114 0,260 0,010
RTsquared 0,017 0,021 0,112 0,025 0,023 0,023 0,050 0,023 0,006 0,009 0,063 0,006
Durbin-Watson 1,827 1,838 1,809 1,878 1,449 1,451 1,928 1,451 1,463 1,467 2,129 1,463
SignificanceTlevelTat***10% **5% *1%
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As an overall summary of the results, only size, P/B and liquidity seem to have any 
statistically significant impact on the abnormal returns of the portfolios. However, the 
statistical significance is concentrated on the returns of the Hold portfolio, which also 
has the highest amount of observations compared to Buy and Sell portfolios. Therefore 
it is possible to achieve more accurate results with more detailed or larger amount of 
data. 
 
The R-squared also remains at a low level across the portfolios, achieving its highest 
value of 0,112 in the Buy portfolio when returns are adjusted with OMXH24 and 
ACCURACY is added to the basic model. The model has the highest explanatory value 
out of the models, which implicates that ACCURACY coefficient could be essential to 
the model. Also, the idea of these regressions was to find new variables to the model of 
Peltoniemi (2012) in order to identify factors that explain the abnormal returns of the 
portfolios that are constructed out of the large listed stocks on the basis of analysts’ 
recommendations. In addition, the new aspect was to examine whether transaction costs 
have any impact in this case. Results suggest that when the portfolio returns were 
adjusted with OMXH, there was only one P/B coefficient in the Sell portfolio with 
statistical significance on 10%, suggesting that PTB has a negative impact on abnormal 
Table 19. Regression results of each model after transaction costs and adjusting 
portfolio returns with OMXH24 
 
Coefficients Buy-tc-
omxh24
Buy-tc-
omxh24
Buy-tc-
omxh24
Buy-tc-
omxh24
hold-tc-
omxh24
hold-tc-
omxh24
hold-tc-
omxh24
hold-tc-
omxh24
Sell-tc-
omxh24
Sell-tc-
omxh24
Sell-tc-
omxh24
Sell-tc-
omxh24
intercept 0,042 0,045 0,100*** 0,062 -0,042** -0,046** -0,079 -0,044** -0,056*** -0,064*** -0,035 -0,050
t-statistic 1,223 1,284 1,805 1,060 -2,241 -2,313 -1,346 -2,324 -1,680 -1,672 -1,019 -1,385
ROIC 0,000 0,000 0,001 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
t-statistic 0,017 0,296 0,367 0,090 0,481 0,589 0,806 0,663 0,053 0,021 -0,253 -0,038
LIQ -0,001 0,000 0,001 -0,001 0,000 0,000 0,001** 0,000 0,000 0,001 0,001 0,001
t-statistic -1,222 -0,577 1,077 -1,094 0,654 -0,125 2,033 0,611 0,688 0,801 1,218 0,732
MCAP -0,005 -0,004 -0,008 -0,003 0,005*** 0,005*** 0,008 0,007*** 0,007 0,007 0,004 0,008
t-statistic -1,016 -0,968 -1,211 -0,467 1,792 1,876 1,074 1,972 1,287 1,348 0,901 1,369
PTB 0,003 0,003 -0,017 0,003 -0,002 -0,002 -0,002 -0,003 -0,005 -0,005 -0,006 -0,004
t-statistic 1,003 1,010 -1,302 1,009 -0,666 -0,691 -0,519 -0,880 -1,028 -0,995 -1,129 -0,788
GFCdummy -0,009 0,002 -0,005
t-statistic -0,470 0,602 -0,421
ACCURACY -0,012 -0,001 -0,010
t-statistic -0,749 -0,429 -1,407
LOGTURNOVER -0,004 -0,002 -0,002
t-statistic -0,420 -0,994 -0,544
RSsquared 0,037 0,039 0,080 0,038 0,003 0,034 0,004 0,037 0,019 0,020 0,057 0,021
Durbin-Watson 1,848 1,857 1,589 1,866 1,997 2,001 2,165 1,998 1,960 1,958 2,062 1,958
SignificanceSlevelSat ***10% **5% *1%
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returns. However, after adjusting with trading costs, the results of the Hold portfolio 
also suggested price-to-book to impact the abnormal returns negatively. 
 
More research on the area of abnormal returns generated by the portfolios is needed 
with wider and more accurate data, probably from other countries, in order to achieve 
more accurate results. This also continued the new area of research, how stock specific 
characteristics could explain the abnormal returns, which was started by Peltoniemi 
(2012). Results are promising and further research is suggested in this field.  
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9. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The purpose of this study was to examine two phenomena related to analysts’ 
recommendations. Firstly, I investigated whether it is possible to achieve statistically 
significant abnormal returns by following analysts’ recommendations of large stocks 
and hence break the efficient market hypothesis. Secondly, this study tried to determine 
whether the stocks with similar recommendations share some stock-or firm-specific 
characteristics, which impact the abnormal returns of the portfolios and thus 
consciously or unconsciously impact analysts’ recommendations. As for the data, this 
study employs the 24 largest stocks listed in OMXH. The OMXH24 index is 
constructed on the basis of the returns of the 24 largest Finnish stocks as of beginning of 
2015. A 1-month Euribor is used as the risk-free rate. The analysts’ consensus 
recommendations and target prices are also employed in this study. All of the data is 
collected from the Thomson Reuters database between 1999 and 2014. The hypotheses 
are the following: 
 
H1: By following analyst recommendations it is not possible to achieve statistically 
significant abnormal returns before and after transaction costs 
 
H2: Stocks with the same consensus recommendations do not have similar stock-
specific characteristics with each other before or after taking transaction costs into 
consideration 
 
The abnormal returns were examined by constructing three portfolios Buy, Hold and 
Sell on the basis of analysts’ consensus recommendations. While Buy is the most 
favourable portfolio, Hold is somewhat neutral and Sell is the least favourable. The 
monthly abnormal and the risk-free return adjusted abnormal returns (Jensen’s alphas) 
were calculated for the portfolios. The statistical significance was tested with the 
market-model regression that is based on CAPM. OMXH and OMXH24 were used as 
the market return and a 1-month Euribor as the risk-free return.  
 
The total cumulative returns of the portfolios differed greatly from the cumulative 
market return of the OMXH, however, they were closer to the cumulative return of 
OMXH24. The cumulative returns from 1999 to 2014 were somewhat loyal to the 
recommendations. The abnormal returns of Buy and Hold portfolios were 88,17% and 
91,78% respectively and the total return of the Sell portfolio remained at -17,99% when 
adjusted with OMXH. When results are adjusted with the OMXH24 index, the returns 
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were -6,73%, -3,13% and -112,90%, respectively. The setup changes after transaction 
costs were taken into consideration when the Buy portfolio yielded the highest 
abnormal return of 79,35%. The Hold portfolio yielded 67,36% and the Sell portfolio -
33,17% when adjusted with OMXH. However, the results change when benchmarked 
with OMXH24 - the results were -15,55%, -27,55% and -128,08% respectively. It can 
be concluded that trading costs seem to play a significant role in terms of cumulative 
abnormal returns of the portfolios. However, by following the Buy and Hold 
recommendations, it is possible to beat the market by almost 80%, even after trading 
costs. When following Buy recommendations, and by 67% when following Hold 
recommendations. Also a long-short portfolio was constructed which yielded a total 
cumulative 15-year return of 43,46% and only 19,36% after transaction costs. When 
adjusted with OMXH and OMXH24 the abnormal returns before transaction costs were 
the worst out of all portfolios when benchmarked with OMXH -48,36% and with 
OMXH24 -143,27%. After transaction costs the returns drop significantly to -72,46% 
when benchmarked with OMXH and -167,37% when benchmarked with OMXH24. 
 
My regression analysis supports the previous findings by yielding significant alphas for 
every portfolio when the portfolios are regressed on OMXH. The alphas remained 
positive and statistically significant at 1%-level even after adjusting for trading costs. 
The only curious thing was that the Sell portfolio yielded a positive and significant 
alpha, but the R-squared was only 17%, approximately half of the R-squared of the Buy 
portfolio and one third of the Hold portfolio. This indicates that the model did not 
explain the abnormal returns particularly well. The alpha of the Buy portfolio was 0,465. 
On the basis of my findings the first hypothesis H:1 is rejected in the case of Buy and 
Hold portfolios. It can be concluded that it is possible to generate statistically significant 
abnormal returns by following analysts’ recommendations of large stocks in the Finnish 
stock market which have received a recommendation of Buy or Hold. Also the Sell 
portfolio yielded a positive alpha of 0,596, but the R-squared was very small compared 
to other portfolios, which raises some red flags. 
 
Only the Buy portfolio remained statistically significant before and after trading costs, 
when the portfolios were regressed on OMXH24. The Buy portfolio thus yields 
statistically significant alpha on 1%-level, confirming the previous results. The R-
squared also experiences a strong increase during this examination and the alphas of 
Hold and Sell portfolios were negative and insignificant after trading costs. On the basis 
of this regression analysis the H1 is rejected in the case of the Buy portfolio only. 
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There are two possible explanations for the results. The first possibility is that the 
analysts’ recommendations do break the efficient market hypothesis and their 
recommendations do include new information, which is released to the market when the 
recommendation is issued. The second explanation is that the Finnish stock market may 
not operate as efficiently as it could. More research on the subject is needed, however, 
my results suggest that it is possible to beat the market by following analysts’ Buy 
recommendations of large stocks in the Finnish stock market. These results are in line 
with previous findings on the field by Barber et al. (2001), Nandelstadh (2003), Bodi & 
Womack (2006), Fariborz et al. (2009) and Bradley et al. (2014). Peltoniemi (2012) was 
not able to identify statistically significant alpha in his study. However, this is the first 
study that has achieved statistically significant alphas with large stocks and post-
financial crisis data on the Finnish stock markets. This study could also be carried out, 
by adding another controlling variable to the market model. In addition, examining the 
returns and recommendations with three and/or four factor model could also give 
interesting results. I suggest that more research on this field should be conducted. 
 
The second hypothesis examined the firm- and stock-specific characteristics of the 
stocks with the same recommendation. The dependent variables were the abnormal 
returns of each portfolio Buy, Hold and Sell. Abnormal returns were calculated by 
subtracting OMXH and OMXH24 from the portfolio returns before and after 
transaction costs. OMXH24 was used in order to examine how well the characteristics 
explain abnormal returns generated from an index that includes only the large stocks 
that are under examination in this study. The independent variables in the basic 
regression model were ROIC, LIQ, the natural logarithm of market capitalization and 
price-to-book ratio. The basic model was constructed by Peltoniemi (2012). He was the 
first one to examine the factors that may explain the abnormal returns generated by 
following analysts’ recommendations. Three more variables were then separately added 
to the model in order to examine if these variables increase the explanatory power of the 
model. These added variables were GFCDUMMY, ACCURACY and natural logarithm 
of TURNOVER. 
 
When the abnormal returns were examined by subtracting OMXH from the portfolio 
returns, there was only one statistically significant coefficient on 10%-level that was the 
price-to-book ratio in the Sell portfolio. However, when the abnormal returns were 
examined by using OMXH24 as the market return, the results showed 4 statistically 
significant coefficients only in the Hold portfolio. The basic model and the model with 
GFCDUMMY and LOGTURNOVER implicate that the market capitalization has a 
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positive impact on the returns of the portfolios on 10%-level of statistical significance. 
However when ACCURACY is added to the basic model, the results indicate that LIQ 
impacts the returns of the Hold portfolio. The result shows a statistical significance on 
5%-level. 
 
When trading costs were taken into account, the results surprisingly changed when 
abnormal returns were calculated by applying OMXH market return. The results then 
showed three significant factors that have an impact on portfolio returns. The basic 
model showed that price-to-book impacts the returns of the Hold portfolio negatively on 
10%-level of significance. In addition, when GFCDUMMY is added to the model the 
results remain exactly the same as when examining the price-to-book coefficient. 
However, the negative impact of price-to-book ratio (at 10%-level of significance) on 
returns of the Sell portfolio remains when compared to the results prior to the 
subtraction of transaction costs. Results after adjusting with transaction costs, when 
calculating abnormal returns using OMXH24 as the market benchmark, remain exactly 
the same. 
 
What is notable about the difference between the models is that the model that included 
ACCURACY as an independent variable offered the only result on 5%-level of 
significance and the highest R-squared that indicates an increase in how well the data 
fits the model. The different results before and after transaction costs implicate that 
transaction costs actually impact the explanatory variables of the constructed models. 
These results may open a new area of research, which identifies the stock or-firm 
specific characteristics, which explain the abnormal returns generated by the analysts’ 
recommendations. The results might be more accurate with a larger and more detailed 
data set. This thesis gives implications for further research. 
 
The insufficient data on consensus recommendations on other than large stocks reduced 
the accuracy of this thesis and therefore only the large stocks were examined. This 
thesis uses only monthly consensus recommendations and therefore also monthly data 
on OMXH and OMXH24. The research on the stock-specific characteristics is a 
continuation from the study of Peltoniemi (2012) and thus I have separately added three 
more variables to the Peltoniemi’s basic model. Results indicate that adding 
ACCURACY only yields that LIQ positively impacts the returns of the Hold portfolio 
on 5%-level of significance. Thus, more research is needed in this area. It is possible to 
add even more variables to the regression models and to use daily data in order to 
identify the true drivers of the abnormal returns, to find the stock and firm specific 
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characteristics which impact consciously or unconsciously on analysts’ 
recommendations and to achieve more accurate results.  
 
In addition the analysts’ behavioural biases, which were presented in chapter 3.1 should 
be researched. For example do analysts herd when their forecasting task is harder, or if 
there are many other recommendations on the same stock do analysts prefer to follow 
the recommendations of the other analysts. This area should also be appointed in the 
future studies because it may offer some explanations why it is possible to generate 
abnormal returns by following analysts’ recommendations. Also it is in great interest 
how stock and firm-specific characteristics may impact on the abnormal returns and 
therefore consciously or unconsciously analysts’ recommendations. 
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Appendix 2. Regression results 
 
 
Dependent Variable: BUY_RF   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/17/15   Time: 14:37   
Sample: 1999M01 2014M12   
Included observations: 192   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.465196 0.054906 8.472629 0.0000 
OMXH_RF 0.531151 0.055696 9.536657 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.323718    Mean dependent var 0.987006 
Adjusted R-squared 0.320158    S.D. dependent var 0.076599 
S.E. of regression 0.063158    Akaike info criterion -2.675994 
Sum squared resid 0.757896    Schwarz criterion -2.642061 
Log likelihood 258.8954    Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.662251 
F-statistic 90.94783    Durbin-Watson stat 1.644256 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 
 
 
Dependent Variable: BUY_RF   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/17/15   Time: 14:38   
Sample: 1999M01 2014M12   
Included observations: 192   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.166075 0.063455 2.617225 0.0096 
OMXH24_RF 0.831443 0.064137 12.96357 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.469354    Mean dependent var 0.987006 
Adjusted R-squared 0.466561    S.D. dependent var 0.076599 
S.E. of regression 0.055946    Akaike info criterion -2.918509 
Sum squared resid 0.594685    Schwarz criterion -2.884577 
Log likelihood 282.1769    Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.904766 
F-statistic 168.0543    Durbin-Watson stat 1.785683 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable: BUY_TC_RF   
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Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/17/15   Time: 14:39   
Sample: 1999M01 2014M12   
Included observations: 192   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.464285 0.054894 8.457864 0.0000 
OMXH_RF 0.531611 0.055684 9.546992 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.324192    Mean dependent var 0.986547 
Adjusted R-squared 0.320635    S.D. dependent var 0.076609 
S.E. of regression 0.063144    Akaike info criterion -2.676428 
Sum squared resid 0.757567    Schwarz criterion -2.642496 
Log likelihood 258.9371    Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.662685 
F-statistic 91.14506    Durbin-Watson stat 1.645029 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
      
 
Dependent Variable: BUY_TC_RF   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/17/15   Time: 14:39   
Sample: 1999M01 2014M12   
Included observations: 192   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.164852 0.063418 2.599444 0.0101 
OMXH24_RF 0.832216 0.064100 12.98303 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.470101    Mean dependent var 0.986547 
Adjusted R-squared 0.467312    S.D. dependent var 0.076609 
S.E. of regression 0.055914    Akaike info criterion -2.919650 
Sum squared resid 0.594006    Schwarz criterion -2.885718 
Log likelihood 282.2864    Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.905908 
F-statistic 168.5591    Durbin-Watson stat 1.788011 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 
 
 
Dependent Variable: HOLD_RF   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/17/15   Time: 14:41   
Sample: 1999M01 2014M12   
Included observations: 192   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.402178 0.036386 11.05309 0.0000 
OMXH_RF 0.595488 0.036910 16.13370 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.578055    Mean dependent var 0.987194 
Adjusted R-squared 0.575835    S.D. dependent var 0.064265 
S.E. of regression 0.041855    Akaike info criterion -3.498858 
Sum squared resid 0.332847    Schwarz criterion -3.464926 
Log likelihood 337.8904    Hannan-Quinn criter. -3.485116 
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F-statistic 260.2961    Durbin-Watson stat 1.523122 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 
 
 
Dependent Variable: HOLD_RF   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/17/15   Time: 14:41   
Sample: 1999M01 2014M12   
Included observations: 192   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -0.000392 0.013671 -0.028651 0.9772 
OMXH24_RF 1.000232 0.013818 72.38358 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.965005    Mean dependent var 0.987194 
Adjusted R-squared 0.964821    S.D. dependent var 0.064265 
S.E. of regression 0.012054    Akaike info criterion -5.988534 
Sum squared resid 0.027605    Schwarz criterion -5.954601 
Log likelihood 576.8992    Hannan-Quinn criter. -5.974791 
F-statistic 5239.382    Durbin-Watson stat 1.953806 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 
 
Dependent Variable: HOLD_TC_RF  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/17/15   Time: 14:42   
Sample: 1999M01 2014M12   
Included observations: 192   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.401367 0.036432 11.01678 0.0000 
OMXH_RF 0.595019 0.036957 16.10050 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.577050    Mean dependent var 0.985922 
Adjusted R-squared 0.574824    S.D. dependent var 0.064271 
S.E. of regression 0.041908    Akaike info criterion -3.496314 
Sum squared resid 0.333695    Schwarz criterion -3.462382 
Log likelihood 337.6462    Hannan-Quinn criter. -3.482571 
F-statistic 259.2260    Durbin-Watson stat 1.521468 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
      
 
Dependent Variable: HOLD_TC_RF  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/17/15   Time: 14:43   
Sample: 1999M01 2014M12   
Included observations: 192   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -0.001710 0.013686 -0.124960 0.9007 
OMXH24_RF 1.000279 0.013833 72.31096 0.0000 
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     R-squared 0.964937    Mean dependent var 0.985922 
Adjusted R-squared 0.964753    S.D. dependent var 0.064271 
S.E. of regression 0.012066    Akaike info criterion -5.986432 
Sum squared resid 0.027663    Schwarz criterion -5.952499 
Log likelihood 576.6974    Hannan-Quinn criter. -5.972689 
F-statistic 5228.875    Durbin-Watson stat 1.960281 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 
 
 
Dependent Variable: SELL_RF   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/17/15   Time: 14:52   
Sample: 1999M01 2014M12   
Included observations: 192   
  10.    
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.596414 0.060358 9.881224 0.0000 
OMXH_RF 0.391956 0.061227 6.401720 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.177425    Mean dependent var 0.981477 
Adjusted R-squared 0.173096    S.D. dependent var 0.076352 
S.E. of regression 0.069430    Akaike info criterion -2.486634 
Sum squared resid 0.915900    Schwarz criterion -2.452701 
Log likelihood 240.7168    Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.472891 
F-statistic 40.98202    Durbin-Watson stat 1.792207 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 
 
 
Dependent Variable: SELL_RF   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/17/15   Time: 14:53   
Sample: 1999M01 2014M12   
Included observations: 192   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.079062 0.056881 1.389957 0.1662 
OMXH24_RF 0.913970 0.057493 15.89709 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.570832    Mean dependent var 0.981477 
Adjusted R-squared 0.568574    S.D. dependent var 0.076352 
S.E. of regression 0.050150    Akaike info criterion -3.137226 
Sum squared resid 0.477858    Schwarz criterion -3.103293 
Log likelihood 303.1737    Hannan-Quinn criter. -3.123483 
F-statistic 252.7175    Durbin-Watson stat 2.049584 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Dependent Variable: SELL_TC_RF  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/17/15   Time: 14:53   
Sample: 1999M01 2014M12   
Included observations: 192   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.596057 0.060385 9.870872 0.0000 
OMXH_RF 0.391514 0.061254 6.391629 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.176965    Mean dependent var 0.980686 
Adjusted R-squared 0.172633    S.D. dependent var 0.076365 
S.E. of regression 0.069461    Akaike info criterion -2.485734 
Sum squared resid 0.916724    Schwarz criterion -2.451801 
Log likelihood 240.6304    Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.471991 
F-statistic 40.85292    Durbin-Watson stat 1.794103 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 
 
 
Dependent Variable: SELL_TC_RF  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/17/15   Time: 14:53   
Sample: 1999M01 2014M12   
Included observations: 192   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.079113 0.056974 1.388578 0.1666 
OMXH24_RF 0.913118 0.057587 15.85634 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.569574    Mean dependent var 0.980686 
Adjusted R-squared 0.567309    S.D. dependent var 0.076365 
S.E. of regression 0.050232    Akaike info criterion -3.133957 
Sum squared resid 0.479423    Schwarz criterion -3.100025 
Log likelihood 302.8599    Hannan-Quinn criter. -3.120214 
F-statistic 251.4234    Durbin-Watson stat 2.050870 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 
 
 
